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Chapter 1
An Adverse-Selection Explanation of
Momentum: Theory and Evidence
This paper rationalizes momentum in a competitive market with information asymmetry and
fixed transaction costs. The existence of a fixed cost per transaction faced by uninformed
investors hampers information revelation through price and induces further adverse selec-
tion in quantity. The adverse selection in quantity drives a wedge between returns in-
ferred from observable prices and returns obtained by an uninformed investor. This discrep-
ancy becomes most pronounced when information asymmetry accompanies unbalanced non-
information-driven trades. Momentum thus arises when uninformed investors accommodate
sells (buys) by informed investors who unwind their positions upon the realization of strong
(weak) stock performance. Properly adjusting stock returns for adverse selection by using data
on trading volume substantially mitigates momentum-based arbitrage profits for the sample pe-
riod from 1983 to 2004. In addition, an empirical proxy for exploitable information asymmetry
forecasts the strength of momentum for extreme performers in the recent past.
1.1 Introduction
The momentum effect is one of the most enduring puzzles in asset pricing. Jegadeesh and Tit-
man (1993) find that, when sorted on cumulative returns over the previous 3-12 months, stocks
in the highest return decile continue to perform significantly better than stocks in the lowest
return decile over the ensuing period of 3-12 months.1 Both unconditional and conditional fac-
tor models fail to explain the momentum alpha of roughly 1% per month.2 The predictability
of stock returns at a medium horizon of a quarter up to a year challenges the efficient market
hypothesis, a keystone to classical finance theory.
Stocks that have recently experienced extreme performance are often associated with severe
information asymmetry. Information asymmetry has indeed been empirically identified as an
important determinant of momentum. 3  However, models of information asymmetry alone
cannot generate momentum as long as there are sufficiently many rational investors who are
not constrained in their trading behavior.
Several recent studies argue that momentum trading strategies often require frequent trading
in disproportionately high cost securities. 4 Studies of transaction costs alone can explain how
momentum persists, but cannot explain how momentum arises in the first place and why costs
are particularly high for momentum stocks.
This paper investigates the implications of the simultaneous presence of information asym-
metry and transaction costs, particularly a fixed cost per trade, and demonstrates how momen-
tum arises due to adverse selection in such a competitive market setting. Take a winner stock
as an example. Under information asymmetry, extreme positive stock performance usually co-
incides with high concentration of ownership in the hands of informed investors. After the
positive shock becomes public, informed investors are expected to unload their holdings. The
existence of fixed transaction costs faced by uninformed investors hampers information revela-
tion through price and induces further adverse selection in quantity. Price soars in response to
news of the fundamental, but contains a negative adjustment to compensate uninformed buyers
1'The momentum effect remains robust and pervasive. A large follow-up literature confirms and extends the
original findings. See, for example, Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996), Fama and French (1996), Conrad
and Kaul (1998), Rouwenhorst (1998), Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999), Chan, Hameed and Tong (2000), Hong,
Lim and Stein (2000), Lee and Swaminathan (2000), Grundy and Martin (2001), Jegadeesh and Titman (2001),
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002), Grinblatt and Han (2002), Lewellen (2002), Ahn, Conrad and Dittmar (2003),
Griffin, Ji and Martin (2003), Schwert (2003), Cooper, Gutierrez and Hameed (2004), Korajczyk and Sadka
(2004), Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004), Liu, Warner and Zhang (2005), Frazzini (2006), Hvidkjaer (2006),
Sadka (2006), and Sagi and Seasholes (2006).
SSee evidence in Fama and French (1996), Grundy and Martin (2001), Ahn, Conrad and Dittmar (2003), and
Lewellen and Nagel (2006).
3See evidence in Hong, Lim and Stein (2000).
4 See, for example, Chen, Stanzl and Watanabe (2001), Korajczyk and Sadka (2004), and Lesmond, Schill and
Zhou (2004).
who are subject to such adverse selection. The adjustment in price diminishes gradually with
the bias in share distribution. Momentum thus follows from the dynamics of share distribution.
The adverse selection in quantity, whereby uninformed investors are most likely to own
shares when the underlying asset is least desirable, is reminiscent of the winner's curse in Rock
(1986). Rock (1986) studies the underpricing of initial public offerings, so his result hinges on
a specific pricing mechanism. This paper extends his result to asset pricing and provides a
framework in which such adverse selection arises in a competitive equilibrium without rationing.
A fixed cost per transaction results in lumpy adjustment to individual holdings. If the
population of investors is sufficiently large relative to the size of a supply shock, only some
investors will make a transaction. A larger supply shock involves more investors in trading,
but the price remains constant. Fixed costs introduce a flat segment into the aggregate demand
curve and make price less sensitive to supply shocks.
The lack of a close correspondence between price and asset allocation exacerbates adverse
selection. At certain price levels, private information shifts the demand of better-informed
investors and in turn alters the asset allocation, but leaves price unaffected. Less-informed
investors thus face a price-independent adverse selection 5 when passively providing liquidity.
Their holdings are most likely to increase when the underlying asset is least desirable, and
vice versa. As individual investors cannot directly observe contemporaneous aggregate trading
activities, price does not instantaneously reflect this bias in allocation.
With price-independent adverse selection, the returns inferred from observed prices no longer
coincide with the returns achieved by a marginal uninformed investor. This wedge provides a
rational non-factor-based explanation of the momentum anomaly. The discrepancy can be
either positive or negative and is most pronounced when information asymmetry accompanies
unbalanced non-information-driven trades. In contrast, in traditional asset-pricing models
of adverse selection, price immediately incorporates the part of private information revealed
through trading, so returns to a marginal investor align perfectly with returns implied by
prices.
Without a tight linkage between price and share distribution, private information adversely
5 In this paper, price-independent adverse selection refers to the adverse selection in quantity with price staying
fixed.
affects the probability of an uninformed investor making a transaction. An empirical proxy for
this probability is trading volume. Volume thus complements price in conveying information
regarding returns to a marginal investor. My model derives an empirically testable equilibrium
condition that involves unsigned volume. The hypothesis testing does not require identifying
trades as buyer- or seller-initiated. This simplicity enhances the power of empirical tests.
Properly adjusting returns for adverse selection using data on trading volume reduces both
the economic magnitude and the statistical significance of momentum-based arbitrage profits.
Over the entire sample period from 1983 to 2004, a momentum trading strategy based on
cumulative returns over the past twelve months generates an average alpha 6 of 1.27% per
month over a holding period of six months. The adjustment for price-independent adverse
selection reduces the momentum alpha by 0.89% per month. The momentum alpha that is
actually obtainable by a marginal investor diminishes to 0.37% with t-statistic equal to 0.93.
The results are robust to a variety of factor models, stock exchanges, and subperiods.
This adverse selection explanation of momentum also implies that the degree of informa-
tion asymmetry should predict the magnitude of return momentum. In particular, it is the
degree of exploitable information asymmetry that induces bias in share distribution and causes
seemingly bias in subsequent returns. The model suggests a nonnegative (nonpositive) correla-
tion between return and volume when non-information-driven trades are predominantly buyer-
(seller-) initiated in the current period. The return-volume correlation prior to extreme stock
performance thus becomes a proxy for the degree of information-induced inefficiency in share
distribution. This new predictor forecasts the strength of momentum in the data.
Although my model is motivated by the momentum anomaly, the range of its applications
is not limited to this particular empirical phenomenon alone. To demonstrate the versatility of
the model, I also apply it to another well-known puzzle in the finance and accounting literature,
the post-earnings-announcement drift7 . The same empirical adjustment for price-independent
adverse selection mitigates the drift-based arbitrage profits.
In my model, liquidity and momentum are intrinsically linked. Extreme stock perfor-
mance predicts ensuing non-information-driven trades, so the liquidity cost derived from price-
6The alpha is based on the Fama-French three-factor model.
7 See, for example, Foster, Olsen and Shevlin (1984), and Bernard and Thomas (1989).
independent adverse selection becomes prominent particularly for momentum stocks. This
type of liquidity cost can lead to either positive or negative seemingly abnormal returns, so
illiquidity does not always imply positive "return premium."
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section
3 characterizes a rational expectations equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes the model and explains
what causes momentum. Section 5 presents model implications and empirical findings. Section
5.1 reexamines the profitability of momentum-based and PEAD-based arbitrage. Section 5.2
develops a new predictor of momentum and also relates the theory to existing empirical findings.
Section 6 discusses related literature. Section 7 concludes the paper.
1.2 Mlodel Setup
Consider an infinite horizon model of a simple economy in discrete time. The simple economy
consists of only one risky asset and two types of investors. There is a single physical good
which may be allocated to consumption or savings. All values are expressed in terms of units
of this good.
Each unit of the risky asset pays out a dividend dt right before trades at time t. The
dividend process is taken as exogenous. {dt} is a sequence of discrete random variables that
are independently and identically distributed as follows:{+d, with probability of Idt = 72, where d > 0.
-d, with probability of w
Let Pt denote the price of the risky asset at time t.
The supply of the risky asset at time t is st+,. To get around no trade theorems, this
model assumes st+l to be random. st+l will not be announced to the public until time t + 1.
In particular, st+1 = s + ut+1, where s is a positive constant and ut+l is a discrete random
variable. ut+l takes a value of -u, 0 or +u, where u > 0, and satisfies the following conditional
distribution: given ut,
Pr [ut+1 = ut] = 0;
and Pr [ut+l = x = ut] = 1, where x E {0,+ u}.
ut thus follows a mean-reverting stochastic process and oscillates between the boundaries -u
and +u. Restricting the variation in ut guarantees that the asset supply will always stay finite.
The noisy supply {ut} and the dividend process {dt} are mutually independent.
The change in the random supply (ut - ut-1) can be interpreted literally as a random
number of shares newly issued by the underlying firm. Alternatively, (ut - ut-1) can be
interpreted as a random number of shares that some traders outside the model dump into the
market. Such traders are known as noise traders.
There is a continuum of mass (1 + n) of investors, indexed by j C [0, 1 + n]. Among them,
investor j is informed if j e [0,1] and is uninformed if j e [1,1 + n]. The informed know dt
at time t - 1, one period ahead of the actual dividend payout. Both informed and uninformed
investors behave competitively as price takers.
Let x4 denote the stock holdings of investor j before trades at time t. His total wealth
u4 must equal x- (dt + Pt), since the risky asset is the only saving vehicle in this economy. In
each period, an investor consumes part of his wealth and saves the rest by investing in the risky
asset. Let nt denote his consumption.
At any time t, an investor j chooses his demand of the stock xz+ to maximize a myopic
utility function:
where 0 is the time discount rate and # E [0,1]. wt+l is his total wealth at time t + 1, and
wi+ = x~ (dt+1+Pt+1). El [-] refers to the conditional expectation based on the information
set available to investor j at time t including the stock price Pt.
Investor j must pay a fixed transaction cost c0, whenever he adjusts his stock holdings, i.e.,
4+1  x-. For simplicity, assume
0, forj E [0,1]
c, for j [1,1 + n]
The uninformed pay a flat fee c > 0 per transaction, but the informed do not. The fixed
cost c& represents various costs associated with a transaction, pecuniary or non-pecuniary. For
instance, an individual investor who opts to manage portfolio on his own will normally set up
an account with a discount broker who typically charges a flat fee per transaction. For an
institutional investor, such as a pension fund manager, who may follow conservative investment
strategies, adjusting stock holdings would incur costs in the form of extra communications or
increased career risk.
This model differs from existing models in that it examines the effect of trading frictions
that are imposed on investors who do not possess superior information. Previous studies in
the literature on limits of arbitrage often investigate how trading frictions imposed on better-
informed investors prevent the revelation of private information as investors are somewhat
constrained to trade on information.
In order to generate sensible results with linear preferences, the model further imposes a
carry cost hi and a set of holdings constraints. The cost of carry h3 represents expenses incurred
for every additional unit being held. They differ from variable trading costs, so a positive hi
should not be considered as an additional source of trading frictions. For simplicity, assume
hi=  h, for jE [0,1]
0, for jE [1, 1 + n]
The informed face a cost of carry h, but the uninformed do not.
After taking into account all the costs, the budget constraint for an informed investor
j E [0, 11 becomes
ICJ• ~d -Pt ( tJ+l-•'-hl
and the budget constraint for an uninformed investor becomes
KCt <-- tdt - pt ( xt+I - •t') - +I 3 -jt+
The informed and the uninformed also differ in their holdings constraints:
t C [-a,a], forjE[0,1]
S [0,a], for j E [1, 1 + n]
The informed are allowed to sell short so that they can take advantage of both good and bad
news given a linear preference. The uninformed are however prohibited from short selling. The
no-short-selling constraint helps to simplify the dynamics in the presence of a fixed transaction
cost.
In the aggregate, the informed hold Xt+1 shares, where
X'+1 -• xt+ldj.
jE[0,1]
Similarly, Xt 1+ denotes the aggregate holdings of the uninformed, and
J 1 xt+ldj.
jE[1,1+nl
Both integrals are taken in the Lebesgue sense. Although investors are initially identical
within each type, their holdings may diverge over time. Individual investors do not observe
the aggregate trading activities at time t or the share distribution resulting from trades at time
t. However, all investors can learn about Xt+1 and Xt+, once ut+1 and dt+l get revealed at
time t + 1.
Several more assumptions are in order so that the model obtains a parsimonious closed-form
solution.
s + u + a < na, (1.1)
s - u - a > 0. (1.2)
S 1 , (1.3)
a 2
c u
- < h < - Od, (1.4)
a a 2
and 0 < f < 1. (1.5)
Condition (1.1) implies a sufficiently large aggregate holdings capacity of the uninformed.
The aggregate supply is bounded above by s + u. The aggregate holdings of the informed is
bounded below by -a. As a result, the effective supply for the uninformed, defined as st - X1,
should be bounded above by s + u + a. Because each uninformed investor can hold a shares at
most, Condition (1.1) suggests that the holdings capacity of the uninformed as a whole exceeds
the maximum effective supply. Similarly, the effective supply for the uninformed is bounded
below by s - u - a, so Condition (1.2) ensures that the percentage of shares allocated to the
uninformed never drops to zero.
Condition (1.3) implies that the holdings capacity of the informed a cannot be too large
nor too small. If a > 2u, price will always reveal private information so the model will
lose interesting results, given that all informed investors hold linear preference and behave
competitively as price-takers in this simple model. If a < u, a larger flow of noise trades may
lead to a larger number of equilibrium states and complicate the equilibrium analysis.
Condition (1.4) implies that the magnitude of exploitable information advantage is large
enough to dwarf the trading or holding costs. Note that the scale of noise trades and the
competition among the informed limits how much informed investors can profit from their
information advantage. In this model, a larger a means there is a larger amount of "smart
money" floating in the market. In addition, E < h, so the uninformed have a lower opportunity
cost to provide liquidity than the informed in the absence of information asymmetry. Otherwise,
uninformed investors will never participate in trading in this simple setup.
Finally, imposing Condition (1.5) mutes dynamic effects that are not essential to the key
idea of this paper. The main driving force for dynamics of the returns process in this model
is the change in share distribution. Informed investors may restrain themselves from trading
aggressively on information in fear of substantial adjustment in price tomorrow due to biases
in allocation. A small # thus mitigates the effect of liquidity costs tomorrow, but accentuates
the effect of liquidity costs today.
1.3 Equilibrium
This section solves out a stationary rational expectations equilibrium (hereafter, REE) of the
infinite-horizon model.
Trading frictions, specifically a fixed cost in this model, induce history dependence or in-
ertia in share distribution. Therefore, the past aggregate holdings of the informed and the
uninformed, respectively Xt and Xt, should characterize the equilibrium states, in addition
to the current supply shock ut+1 and the news on the next dividend dt+1. To streamline the
notations, replace Xt with ut as a state variable, since the market-clearing condition implies
Xt = s + ut - Xt. Let (Xit, ut, ut+l, dt+l) denote the state vector. A stationary equilibrium
of this model is hence defined as follows.
Definition 1 A stationary REE is characterized by a price function Pt = p (XI, ut, ut+1, dt+1) ,
under which,
* x4 1 maximizes the utility of investor j, for all j E [0, 1 + n];
* the asset market clears, i.e.,
Sx+ldj = s + ut+1;8
jE[0,1+n]
* when the equilibrium asset allocation is not unique, each allocation is chosen at random
with equal probability.
A fixed transaction cost introduces a kink into individual demand curve which leads to a flat
portion of the aggregate demand curve. At a certain price, the optimal demand of an investor
is not unique. He submits an order given the price, but is indifferent to having or not having
his order filled. If the population of investors is sufficiently large relative to the supply shock,
in equilibrium, only a fraction of the investors will each make a lumpy adjustment, and the
rest will maintain their original holdings. Given that all investors are identical, any individual
investor has a chance of adjusting his holdings. The equilibrium is thus characterized by a single
equilibrium price that corresponds to multiple equilibrium allocations. Under the equilibrium
price, each identical investor is indifferent to any of those possible allocations.
Combining a fixed cost with information asymmetry adds further subtlety to the equilibrium.
The choice of equilibrium allocation may convey further information regarding the asset payoff.
As a result, rational investors will take into consideration this additional information when
deciding on their optimal demand.
The equilibrium concept in this model builds on that in Grossman (1976). The adaptation
concerns the possibility that the equilibrium asset allocation is not unique. In addition to
8 The integral is taken in the Lebesgue sense.
setting a market-clearing price, the hypothetical Walrasian auctioneer in this REE randomly
picks one out of many possible equilibrium asset allocations corresponding to this equilibrium
price. In a symmetric equilibrium, the auctioneer assigns equal probabilities to all possible
allocations.
In such an REE, given a price, investors submit their optimal demand and do not always
know for sure their equilibrium holdings. An equilibrium obtains if all investors' orders are
fulfilled, or if unfulfilled orders do not leave any investor worse-off. Proposition 1 states the
existence of such an equilibrium.
Proposition 1 There exists an equilibrium as is defined in Definition 1.9
The state space of this stationary equilibrium, { (X~, ut, u t+ 1, dt+) }, consists of thirty-six
4 x 1 vectors. In particular, { (XNi ,u, ut+1, dt+i) } = x x U x D, where X = {0, +a}, D = {±d}
and U = { (0, +u), (±u, 0), (±u, Tu)}. With a linear preference, informed investors either hold
a neutral position Xt = 0 when price is fully revealing or trade aggressively on their private
information Xt = ±a, so x = {0, ±a}. D is the support of the dividend shock. U is the
support of the past and the current supply shocks.
The equilibrium price function is summarized in Table 1.1: Pt = p (Xi, ut, ut+l, dt+ 1 ). Be-
cause informed investors behave competitively as price takers, price Pt will fully reveal the pri-
vate information when the distortion in allocation is sufficiently small, i.e., when IXi + ut I < u.
Otherwise, price will be less sensitive to the private information and will stay fixed for a pooling
of different exogenous shocks (ut+1, dt+1).
Define q (Xi, ut) E [pt I Xt, ut], the expected price conditional on the state variables Xt
and ut. The conditional expectation of price on average displays an upward adjustment when
uninformed investors hold more than s shares as a whole and expect to sell in the current round
of trading, and vice versa.
Table 1.2(a) summarizes the equilibrium holdings of an individual informed investor. When
price fully reveals the private information, the informed demand zero shares, 4+1 (Pt) = 0,
because by assumption the informed have a higher opportunity cost to provide liquidity in the
absence of information asymmetry. Otherwise, if the price is not fully revealing, an informed
9 Appendir A provides a proof of Proposition 1.
investor will exploit his private information to the full extent, by holding a shares if dt+1 = d
and by short-selling a shares if dt+ 1 = -d.
Table 1.2(b) and 1.2(c) summarize the equilibrium holdings of an uninformed investor who
previously holds zero and a shares, respectively. In the stationary equilibrium, an uninformed
investor either holds zero or a shares. Whenever an uninformed investor adjusts his holdings,
the size of the adjustment will be exactly a shares. An uninformed marginal investor is always
indifferent to zero and a shares.
The market always clears, as uninformed investors passively provide market liquidity. Define
the residual supply shock for the uninformed as the aggregate supply shock ut+1 - ut minus
the change in the aggregate demand of the informed. If the residual supply shock is positive,
a fraction of uninformed investors who previously hold zero shares will each buy indifferently a
shares. The fraction is proportional to the size of the residual shock. Similarly, if the residual
supply shock is negative, a fraction of uninformed investors who previously hold a shares will
each sell indifferently a shares.
[INSERT TABLE 1.1, and 1.2 (a) - (c)]
1.4 Analysis
1.4.1 Price-Independent Adverse Selection
Imposing a fixed transaction cost excludes the possibility of infinitesimally small adjustments to
an individual investor's stock holdings. When the population of marginal investors is sufficiently
large relative to the size of the supply shock, only a fraction of those identical investors will
make a transaction. In equilibrium, those investors must be trading indifferently. The size of
the fraction, or equivalently the probability of any individual making an adjustment in holdings,
correlates with the change in supply.
In this model, supply shocks of different size are absorbed by different numbers of marginal
uninformed investors each of whom makes an adjustment of a fixed size, a shares. Any
individual investor however does not observe the total volume of trades and cannot infer the
size of a supply shock through his individual holdings. In contrast, in a standard model in
which investors face no fixed transaction cost, supply shocks are absorbed by all investors. The
size of adjustment to individual holdings will vary with the size of the supply shock.
The lack of this close correspondence between individual holdings and the aggregate supply
shock makes price less informative, as individual uninformed investors do not observe contem-
poraneous aggregate trading activities. In the current model, private information shifts the
demand of the informed and in turn alters the asset allocation, but leaves price unaffected.
Uninformed investors thus face a price-independent adverse selection.
For instance, when XJ = -a and ut = +u, the uninformed expect to sell in the current
period to accommodate liquidity trades in the presence of adverse selection. The demand
of the informed varies with their private information, so does the change in the aggregate
holdings of the uninformed. However, any individual marginal uninformed seller does not
observe the total volume of trades, so price does not instantaneously incorporate the relevant
information contained in aggregate trading activities and stays fixed regardless of the current
shock (ut+l, dr+l).
The total volume of trades that involve the uninformed varies with (Ut+1, dt+1) in the fol-
lowing way:
(Ut+1, dt+l) (0, -d) (0, +d) (+u, -d) (+u, +d)
IXtU+1 - XI U u+ 2a 2u 2u+ 2a
Consequently, the posterior of dt+1 conditional on an uninformed investor's selling of a shares
should be:
-d, with probability of3u
S -+d, with probability of 3u+4a
6u+4a±d, with probability of
A marginal uninformed investor is more likely to sell a shares when the next dividend is lower.
If we ignore this bias in asset allocation, the marginal investors would appear to benefit more
from selling than they actually do, as the following distribution of dt+1 inferred from prices
only is mistaken for the true posterior:
d 1 = { -d, with probability of 1S+d, with probability of 1
Proposition 2 and 3 summarize the model implications on return and volume as a conse-
quence of price-independent adverse selection. Define rt =_ (dt + Pt) - Pt-1. Let Vt' denote
the contemporaneous aggregate volume of trades that involve uninformed investors at time t- 1.
Uninformed investors do not know VtU until time t. Vti" > 0 indicates buys by uninformed in-
vestors; and Vt1 < 0 indicates sells. Let 7r' denote the ratio of . It is immediate that
E [r'] = 1.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium,
IE [rtr]l = c 10
a
Proposition 3 In equilibrium, if non-information-driven trades in the current period are pre-
dominantly buys, i.e.,
Pr [Vtu > 01 X i z, ut-1] < Pr [Vtu < 0 1 Xt i -, at-1] ,
then
cov [rt, VUl I Xz• 1, ut-1] > 0;
otherwise, if non-information-driven trades in the current period are predominantly sells, i.e.,
Pr [Vt" > 0 1 XXI, ut-1] > Pr [Vt" < 0 I XL1 , ut.]
then
COv [rt, IVUl I Xtl, ut-1] < 0.11
Proposition 2 implies that, if ~ 0,
E [rt] = -cov (rt, ,u) .
The covariance between the asset payoff and the relative change in volume predicts the return
observed in prices. It is the relative change in aggregate volume rather than the absolute
change that matters. The magnitude of this apparent return predictability is thus potentially
large and is not directly constrained by the size of the fixed cost.
10 See a proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix B.
1t See a proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix B.
Proposition 3 claims that this covariance can be either positive or negative. The return
predictability driven by this covariance is most pronounced when unbalanced non-information-
driven trades accompany information asymmetry.
1.4.2 Momentum
The existence of price-independent adverse selection drives a wedge between the returns ac-
tually achieved by a marginal uninformed investor and the returns observed in prices. This
discrepancy in returns can be either positive or negative. Momentum arises endogenously in
this model.
Proposition 4
E [rt+l I rt > 0 and Xt > 0] > 0;
and, similarly,
E [rt+l I rt < 0 and Xt < 0] < 0.12
In this model, a large positive return rt often coincides with low concentration of ownership
by the uninformed as a whole immediately before the realization of rt. The uninformed thus
expect to buy following the positive stock performance. In the presence of price-independent
adverse selection, the uninformed are mostly likely to acquire the shares when the asset is least
desirable. The current price pt thus contains a downward adjustment to compensate investors
for this adverse selection in quantity. The return rt+1 in the next period will appear to be
higher than is justified. The opposite occurs for a loser stock.
The positive return autocorrelation results from information-induced biases in asset alloca-
tion. Informed investors establish large positions to exploit their information advantage and
would like to rebalance their holdings after the realization of extreme stock performance. This
tendency to unwind the information-induced bias in asset allocation generates unbalanced non-
information-driven trades in the ensuing periods. Momentum thus arises as passive uninformed
liquidity providers demand a compensation for price-independent adverse selection.
In contrast, if the informed have not managed to exploit the news before its release, returns
do not display momentum. The fluctuation in price sometimes results from the variation
12See a proof of Proposition 4 in Appendix C.
in mean-reverting noise trades, which leads to return reversal in this model, as is stated in
Proposition 5.
Proposition 5
E [rt+i I rt > 0 and Xt = 0] < 0;
and, similarly,
E [rt+l I rt < 0 and Xt = 0] > 0.13
Extreme stock performance typically goes hand in hand with information asymmetry, so
stocks that have just yielded extreme returns should in general exhibit momentum, as is demon-
strated by the simulated momentum profits in Table 1.3.
Table 1.3 summarizes the simulated momentum trading profits arising in this dynamic
model, when = 0.5, d = 1, a = 0.6, h = 0.011, and ! = 0.01. The reported statistics area a
based on 100 simulations with a panel of 1000 stocks and 100 periods. The table shows the
average dollar gains per period over the formation period (column 1), and one-period dollar
gains over the first period up to the fifth period (column 2 through 6) ensuing the portfolio
formation. Each panel includes simulated profits for the formation horizon of both one and two
periods (row 1 and 3). Because it is not meaningful to report the corresponding t-statistics,
I report instead a statistic defined as the sample probability of a random variable having the
same sign as the respective mean (row 2 and 4).
For comparison, Table 1.3 also includes simulation results for the benchmark models.14
Panel (A) presents results for the first benchmark model with information asymmetry only.
Without fixed transaction cost, price fully reveals the private signal in this model and thus
eliminates exploitable information advantage. As a result, momentum profits are on average
zero, for any J-K strategy. Panel (B) presents results for the second benchmark model with
fixed transaction costs only. No investor knows dt+1 in advance. Winners are stocks that
have had higher dividends and whose supplies have decreased recently, and losers are stocks
that have had lower dividends and whose supplies have increased recently. Sorting on dollar
gains correlates with sorting on noisy supplies. Reversals in return thus result from reversals
13 See a proof of Proposition 5 in Appendix C.
14 See Appendix D for the analysis of benchmark models.
in noisy supply, as is predicted by Proposition 5. In contrast, Panel (C) demonstrates the
combined effect of information asymmetry and fixed transaction costs - momentum. Panel
(D) shows the simulated momentum profits weighted by the volume of trades that involve
uninformed investors. As is predicted by Proposition 2, the weighted momentum profits is just
large enough to compensate investors for the fixed transaction cost. The return momentum
in this model lasts for no more than two periods. This short duration of momentum results
from the artificial assumptions of quick mean-reversion in noisy supplies and the linear utility
function.
[INSERT TABLE 1.3]
1.5 Empirical Implications and Findings
1.5.1 Return and Volume
Proposition 2 provides an immediately testable empirical claim on return and volume,
IZ [rt 7r I I -, 7
a
where r [= I]1
Any reasonable reckoning of fixed trading costs in practice suggests it is plausible to ignore
the direct effect of the fixed cost .. Let Vt denote the unsigned aggregate trading volume and
Vt •' denote the unsigned volume of trades that do not involve uninformed marginal investors
as are delineated in the model. Similarly, define lrt as the ratio of - . Replacing ir' with
7rt, we obtain that
IE [rt-7rt] •< IE [rt]I
and, if E[V"'nu]
t-and, if is sufficiently small,
JE [rtirt] I 0.15
The theory implies that for stocks that display significant return predictability after adjust-
1 5See Appendix B for a detailed derivation.
ment for risk, i.e., IE [rt]I > 0,
IE [rt] - IE [rtrtl] > 0, (1.6)
and
[E [r7rt][ - 0 if E [Vt 0. (17)E [Vt-----]•0 (1.7)
Equation (1.6) claims that the return obtainable by an uninformed marginal investor devi-
ates from the return observed via prices when there is observed return predictability. Equation
(1.7) derives from the unpredictability of return actually achievable by a marginal investor.
Based on these two conditions, the remainder of this section will empirically test two null
hypotheses:
Null Hypothesis I: E [rt-rt] = 0;
Null Hypothesis II: E [rt] - E [rtrt] = 0.
As is demonstrated in the literature, an equal-weighted momentum-based arbitrage portfolio
delivers positive profits consistently over time, i.e., E [rt] > 0. The current model argues that
such an arbitrage portfolio may not be feasible in practice. For an investor who pursues
momentum trading strategies but does not possess superior information, the arbitrage portfolio
he actually obtains can differ from the equal-weighted portfolio. Therefore, the efficient market
hypothesis should imply E [rtrt] = 0 instead of E [rt] = 0. Given that E [rt] = 0, it follows
that E [rt]- E [rtrt] > 0.
Data
Stock data on return, price, and trading volume come from CRSP. Data on trading volume
are unavailable for NASDAQ stocks prior to November 1, 1982.16 In order to include stocks
on all exchanges, the sample period starts in January 1983 and ends in December 2004. This
study restricts data to all ordinary common stocks1 7 of non-financial firms18 that are traded
on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ. Following Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), I exclude stocks
in the smallest decile where breakpoints are determined within the NYSE stocks and stocks
16See page #110 of "Data Description Guide for CRSP US Stock and CRSP US Indices Databases."
1
7 Stocks with a CRSP share code ("shrcd") of either 10 or 11.
18 A firm is considered to be in the financial industry if its 4-digit SIC code is between 6000 and 6999. Including
financial firms do not alter the results qualitatively.
with prices lower than five dollars on the formation date, which is intended to preclude issues
regarding small firms and extremely low liquidity.
At the end of each month t, stocks are sorted into deciles according to their cumulative
returns compounded over the prior one year, from month (t - 12) through (t - 1). A stock
will drop out of the sample if it has at least one missing monthly return during the formation
period. The momentum strategy examined in this paper takes a long position in an equal-
weighted portfolio of stocks in the highest return decile (defined as the winner stocks) and a
short position in an equal-weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest return decile (defined as
the loser stocks). There is a one-month interval between the twelve-month formation period
and the six-month investment period, to avoid possible short-run return predictability due to
microstructure issues.
As is documented in the literature, the profitability of a momentum trading strategy is
measured by the difference in average first-month return between the monthly rebalanced winner
and loser portfolios. I also measure the momentum profits over a longer horizon, specifically
over six months, by calculating the average monthly gains on an overlapping portfolio that in
any calendar month holds an equal proportion of the zero-investment momentum portfolios
selected in the previous six months.
Let IW' and I L denote respectively the winner and the loser portfolios that are formed at
the end of month s. For a stock i that belongs to IW or I L , v' refers to the sum of all daily
dollar trading volumes in month t. Daily dollar volume is the product of daily volume and daily
price, both of which are provided in the CRSP daily stock file. I use dollar volumes in place
of share volumes to tease out artificial variations resulting from stock splits or stock dividends.
8+6
Because trading volumes vary widely across stocks, the average volume g i 6 • over the
r=s+l
corresponding six-month investment period is applied to standardize vt so that ~ becomes a
Vt
proxy for Vt that is comparable across stocks. Vt is calculated using monthly observations
during the investment period, since the trading volume of momentum stocks likely behave
differently before and after the formation date. The cross-sectional average of the
respective winner (k = W) or loser (k = L) portfolio is used as a proxy for E [Vt], assuming
that the portfolio is well-diversified. I then construct weights w' as a proxy for 7rt, such
that w = Hereafter, I call this set of weights the PIAS (the acronym for price-
independent adverse selection) ratios, which represent the adjustment factor on stock returns
to account for price-independent correlation between asset payoff and holdings. The PIAS
S E_:__
weights average to one by construction. Finally, the difference in t between the
s=1
winner (k = W) and the loser (k = L) portfolios forms an empirical proxy for the momentum
trading profits that are actually achieved by an uninformed investor in time t. This paper
reexamines the profitability of momentum-based arbitrage, for S = 1 and for S = 6.
The results of the model are only applicable to information asymmetry regarding idiosyn-
cratic risks only, and extending the analysis to information asymmetry regarding macro risks is
out of the scope of the current paper. The empirical tests should therefore weight the idiosyn-
cratic component of return, but I proceed with raw returns instead for the following reasons.
First, to filter out excess returns by employing a factor model introduces considerable noises to
the system and imposes extra restrictions on the data set. In particular, stocks with extreme
returns are likely to incur large measurement errors in beta, which can be amplified through the
subsequent weighting procedure. In addition, it is well known that neither the CAPM nor the
Fama-French three-factor model explains return momentum. Hence, even if there exists some
correlation between volume and beta, the biases should offset once we subtract the mean of the
short portfolio from that of the long portfolio. There is no existing theory to my knowledge
that predicts systematic difference in volume-beta correlation.
Figure (1 - 1) displays the time-variation of both the commonly-applied measure and the
theory-based measure of momentum profits. The profitability measure weighted by the PIAS
ratio and the standard equally-weighted average move in tandem. The two trajectories are
almost identical except for a slight downward shift of the former relative to the latter. Figure
(1 - 2) plots the difference between the PIAS-weighted measure and the equally-weighted mea-
sure. The return adjustment for price-independent adverse selection does not appear to spike
around major episodes of market illiquidity. Unreported results suggest that macro factors,
including the market, SMB 19 , HML20 , the Pdstor-Stambaugh liquidity and the Sadka liquidity
19The SMB factor is also known as the size factor and is measured as the average return of small firms minus
that of big firms. See Fama and French (1993) for details.
2 0The HML factor is also known as the value factor and is measured as the average return of high-BM-ratio
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Figure 1-1: Momentum Profits, 1983-2004
factors, explain little of the variation in the PIAS adjustment, which supports that the model
provides a non-factor-based explanation of return predictability.
Momentum Profits Reexamined
Table 1.4 compares the standard measure and the PIAS-adjusted measure of momentum profits
for the entire sample period from 1983 to 2004. The top panel reports momentum profits
without risk adjustment, and the next two panels, respectively, report risk-adjusted estimates
based on the CAPM and the Fama-French three-factor model. Similarly, Table 1.5 shows the
comparison for the subsample period from 1994 to 2004.
[INSERT TABLE 1.4 and 1.5]
I report simple t-statistics for all empirical estimates. The theory does not predict any
autocorrelation for all time series in Table 1.4 and 1.5, which is in fact supported by unreported
firms minus that of low-BM-ratio firms. See Fama and French (1993) for details.
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Figure 1-2: The PIAS Adjustment of Momentum Profits, 1983-2004
results. It is verified that the statistical significance does not alter with Newey-West corrections
for serial correlation in errors nor with Huber-White corrections for heteroskedasticity.
It is well-documented in the literature that momentum profits have been persistently and
significantly positive. Table 1.4 first replicates the standard measures of momentum profits.
The estimates are consistent with previous findings. For the whole sample period of 1983 to
2004, the past winner portfolio continues to outperform the past loser portfolio by a monthly
average of 1.54% over the first month of the holding period. The corresponding t-statistic is
3.59. The continuation in return stays significant, both economically and statistically, over six
months. The six-month average of monthly momentum profits is 0.87%. The t-statistic is
relatively low but still indicates a significance level of about 2%. For the subsample period of
1994 to 2004, which starts one year after the publication of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), the
first-month average of momentum profits becomes even higher though less significant statisti-
cally. The six-month average becomes statistically insignificant, but the alpha based on the
three-factor model remains as high as 1.25% with a t-statistic of 1.95. The momentum alphas
based on the CAPM are almost identical to the raw estimates without risk adjustment. The
momentum alphas based on the three-factor model are in general of slightly larger magnitude
and have a higher t-statistic.
In contrast, weighting returns by the PIAS ratio eliminates both the economic significance
and the statistical significance of profitability estimates. The PIAS-weighted average is 0.62%
over the first month and -0.05% over a six-month holding period, and neither of the two
is statistically significant. Similarly, the weighting removes significance for all risk-adjusted
estimates except for one case. The first-month three-factor alpha of the entire sample period
is 0.96% with t-statistic equal to 2.19, compared to the equally weighted average of 1.87% with
t-statistic equal to 4.39.
As is predicted by the model, the correction is significant when IE [r] J > 0. Table 1.4 and
1.5 also show the magnitude and the statistical significance of return adjustment for PIAS. The
PIAS adjustment is uniformly about 1% for different sample periods and for different holding
horizons, either over one month or over six month. Although the momentum profits appear to
be more volatile from 1994 to 2004, the t-statistic associated with the adjustment remains high
and close to 10. The significant difference between the PIAS-weighted and the equally-weighted
measures invalidates the possibility that data falsely support the null hypothesis owing to a lack
of statistical power.
For any vt, I standardize the volume measure through dividing it by the respective average
V which averages six monthly observations including vt. The use of a short window potentially
creates a bias that understates the relative deviation of vt. Therefore, the constructed PIAS
weights, if anything, tend to under-correct the bias in the standard measure.
A usual suspect of momentum is the use of positive-feedback strategies as is discussed in De-
Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) or in Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996).
If positive-feedback trades push price further along the direction of its previous movement
and thus cause momentum, the contemporaneous return would be positively correlated to the
PIAS weight for winners and negatively for losers. Therefore, the results in Table 1.4 and 1.5
contradict this alternative explanation.
Finally, recall that the model predicts that IE [rt7rt]l - 0 if and only if E[V ,- 0. Given
IE [rJ| > 0, IE [rt-rt]l 0 should imply E[ ~, 0. Hence, the empirical findings in Table 1.4
and 1.5 suggest little influence of over a period of six months but a perhaps nontrivial
E[Vtnu]
role of t over the first month, for momentum stocks. Although the momentum profits
are weaker over a period of six months, the PIAS adjustment appears the same as, if not larger
than, that of the first month.
Another Application: PEAD
This paper provides a general framework to study a financial market that is subject to both
fixed transaction costs and information asymmetry. Although this study is motivated by the
momentum anomaly, the range of applications of this model are not limited to this particular
empirical phenomenon alone. To demonstrate the versatility of the model, I therefore apply
it to another well-known puzzle in the finance and accounting literature, the post-earnings-
announcement drift (hereafter, PEAD).
The PEAD resembles the momentum anomaly in many aspects. Bernard and Thomas
(1989) document that the PEAD lasts up to 180 trading days, or three quarters, relative to the
earnings announcement, dies out around the fourth quarter and eventually disappears with a
tiny reversal. The same pattern holds across different size groups. I replicate the phenomenon
for the sample period from 1983 to 2004 and for the subsample period from 1994 to 2004.
I construct a PEAD-based arbitrage portfolio that assumes a long position in firms of
the top decile with highest SUE 2 1 in the previous quarter and a short position in firms of
the bottom decile. Although the PEAD and the momentum anomaly have several traits in
common, the composition of the arbitrage portfolios built upon the two empirically identified
anomalies differs widely. On average, about 13% (16%) of the firms in the highest (lowest)
return decile overlap with about 11% (14%) of the firms in the corresponding highest (lowest)
SUE decile. This verifies that we are testing the theory with two distinctive sets of stocks,
since randomly selecting a tenth of all firms will generate an average of 10% overlap between
any two independent random draws.
The sample includes all firms that are traded on NYSE/AMEX or NASDAQ and have at
21 SUE stands for standardized unexpected earnings. The unexpected earnings is estimated through a random-
walk model allowing for a non-zero drift by using the latest twenty quarterly observations. The estimate is then
standardized through dividing it by the standard deviation.
least ten consecutive earnings22 observations on Compustat. A further screening requires firms
to have March, June, September or December fiscal-year ends, to ensure that fiscal quarters
are aligned. The arbitrage portfolios are equal-weighted and are rebalanced quarterly at the
end of every calendar quarter. To avoid microstructure issues, the sample excludes firms with
stock price lower than $5 at the end of the earnings quarter. Firms who announce earnings
later than two months after a fiscal quarter ends are also excluded so that there is at least
a one-month interval between the earnings announcement and the investment period. This
screening only applies to a small fraction of firms, as normally more than 90% of the earnings
announcements come out within two months after the end of a fiscal quarter. The investment
strategy is examined respectively for a holding period of one and two quarters, and the latter
employs an overlapping portfolio that in any calendar month holds an equal proportion of the
zero-investment arbitrage portfolios selected within the previous six months.
Table 1.6 compares the standard measure and the PIAS-adjusted measure of profits on the
PEAD-based arbitrage portfolio for the entire sample period from 1983 to 2004. The top panel
reports monthly profits without risk adjustment, and the next two panels, respectively, report
risk-adjusted profits based on the CAPM and the Fama-French three-factor model. Similarly,
Table 1.7 shows the comparison for the subsample period from 1994 to 2004.
[INSERT TABLE 1.6 and 1.7]
Once adjusted for the price-independent adverse selection, the PEAD, either the raw or the
risk-adjusted measure, is no longer statistically nor economically significant, for both sample
periods. The correction to the standard measure is shown to stay significant even when the
PEAD appears weak in the latest decade. In addition, the correction varies little with different
means of risk adjustment.
The drift in this paper appears relatively weaker than in some other studies of PEAD. Firms
are ranked quarterly based on the latest earnings announcement so that the top and the bottom
SUE decile consist of a diverse cross-section of firms. The portfolio is formed at a quarterly
frequency, because diversity is required for the empirical PIAS adjustment to be effective. In
addition, this paper employs SUE as a proxy for earnings surprise. Normalizing the surprise
2 2Earnings are measured before extraordinary items, i.e., Compustat data8.
by the standard deviation of earnings growth reduces the portfolio weight on small firms which
tend to have noisier earnings growth and larger drift. A weaker drift however does not obscure
the evidence of the return adjustment for PIAS.
Recall that the model predicts that IE [rtrt]jl 0 if and only if E[Vu 0. Given
E [r]l >0, JE [rt-- ~ ] 0 should imply EEV Q 0. Hence, the empirical findings in TableEE 
fVt
1.6and1.7sugestlitle nflenc ofE[V1nul1.6 and 1.7 suggest little influence of over a period of six months but a perhaps nontrivial
E[Vtnul
role of E over the first quarter, especially for the first half of the sample period.
1.5.2 Predictability of Excess Returns
In a standard asset-pricing model, the efficient market hypothesis permits no predictability of
risk-adjusted returns, i.e., E [rt] = 0. In contrast, the current model with both information
asymmetry and fixed transaction costs derives that, if S - 0,
E [rt] = -cov (rt, rt).
This return predictability does not contradict the semi-strong form of market efficiency,
because the return observed via prices deviates from the return obtainable by a marginal in-
vestor in the current model. The return predictability should be most pronounced when high
information asymmetry accompanies unbalanced non-information-driven trades, according to
Proposition 3.
Predicting Return Momentum - New Evidence
Two attributes of stocks with extreme past performance account for momentum. First, extreme
stock performance and information asymmetry go hand in hand. Even after the realization
of unusual returns, the degree of information asymmetry will probably remain high. Second,
privately informed investors are likely to have accumulated excessive positions in the previous
period. The deviation of their holdings from a neutral position generates a subsequent flow
of non-information-driven trades that are predominantly buyer- or seller-initiated. Therefore,
one way to predict the strength of return momentum is to investigate to what extent informed
investors manage to exploit their information advantage.
In general, informational buys induce less price impact when accompanied by liquidity sells,
and vice versa. Therefore, the ratio of liquidity buy volume to liquidity sell volume before
the realization of extreme stock performance, hereafter referred to as the BOS ratio, provides
a proxy for the extent to which informed investors profits from their private information. In
particular, the higher (lower) the BOS ratio, the stronger the momentum of a loser (winner)
stock.
Proposition 3 motivates an empirical proxy for the BOS ratio, cov , rt . For a
stock i belonging to the monthly-rebalanced momentum portfolio that is formed in month
s, the mean E [vI] and the covariance coy (vt, r,) are measured using monthly observations
(vi- 12 ,-7 7-12-r) over the twelve months immediately before the formation period, i.e., - =
1,.., 12.
Stocks are then sorted on the BOS ratio into three quantiles within the winner (R10) and
the loser (R1) portfolios. P3 and P1, respectively, denote the subgroup that should have the
strongest and the weakest momentum in return. Table 1.8 reports the risk-adjusted returns
for each subportfolio after the sorting. The left panel shows the alphas based on the CAPM,
and the right panel shows the alphas based on the three-factor model. Panel (A), (B) and (C)
present the risk-adjusted returns over a holding period of one, three and six months, respectively.
As is predicted by the theory, the empirical proxy for the BOS ratio predicts return mo-
mentum for both the winner stocks and the loser stocks. Over the first month, P3 outperforms
P1 by 0.65% for winners, and P1 underperforms P3 by 0.95% (CAPM-a) and by 0.82% (FF-a)
for losers. Over a holding period of three months, P3 outperforms P1 by 0.6% per month
for winners, and P1 underperforms P3 by 0.59% (CAPM-a) and by 0.45% (FF-a) per month
for losers. Over a holding period of six months, P3 outperforms P1 by 0.6% per month for
winners, and P1 underperforms P3 by 0.32% (CAPM-a) and by 0.18% (FF-a) per month for
losers. The predicted difference remains significant and almost constant over six months for
winners, but starts at a very high level and then falls gradually for losers. The different pat-
terns suggest that informed investors are more likely to hold excessive positions of winners for
longer, which probably results from the relatively high cost of short selling. In addition, the
three-factor alpha of the R10-P1 subportfolio is no longer significant at the 5% level, except for
being marginally significant over the first month.
[INSERT TABLE 1.8]
Table 1.9 presents the summary statistics for some characteristics of the subportfolios. In
particular, the numbers shown in the table are the time-series average of respective summary
statistics for the monthly-rebalanced subportfolios. For winners, the stocks with stronger mo-
mentum in fact have larger market capitalization and lower past return on average. For losers,
the stocks with stronger momentum have slightly smaller market capitalization and similar past
return. Therefore, it is unlikely due to correlation with size or past stock performance that
the BOS ratio predicts return for momentum stocks.
[INSERT TABLE 1.9]
Predicting Return Momentum - Existing Evidence
Section 3.2.1 offers one predictor of return momentum. In principle, proxies for information
asymmetry, specifically proxies for the extent of exploitable information asymmetry, and proxies
for the market structure should somehow predict momentum.
Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) test the gradual-information-diffusion model of Hong and Stein
(1999) and establish three key empirical results regarding the profitability of momentum strate-
gies: momentum strategies are most profitable among firms with small market capitalization
and low analyst coverage; furthermore, the marginal importance of analyst coverage is great-
est among small stocks. Analyst coverage is essentially a measure of information asymmetry.
Firm size is also a proxy for the degree of information imperfection and moreover is an im-
portant determinant of the underlying market structure. The dual role of size can explain
why it affects both the magnitude of momentum and the first-order derivative with respect to
the degree of information asymmetry. HLS (2000) also find that the effect of residual analyst
coverage is entirely driven by what happens in the loser stocks. Although they argue that
information problem is more severe for bad news, it should also exist for good news. What
analyst coverage may not capture is to what extent the information advantage is exploitable by
privately informed investors. Table 1.8 employs a different proxy and augments their findings.
Grinblatt and Han (2002) and Frazzini (2005) provide empirical evidence supporting a be-
havioral explanation of the momentum anomaly, which builds upon the disposition effect, the
tendency of investors to ride losses and realize gains. Both studies construct some measures of
unrealized capital gains/losses by using stock market data or holdings data. The constructed
proxies for capital gains/losses "overhang" subsume other predictors of short-term stock re-
turns, such as past returns and volumes. The model in this paper provides an alternative
interpretation of their results. For example, consider the overhang spread in Frazzini (2005).
Good (bad) news induces high (low) returns and relatively large turnover right before the runup
(rundown) when privately informed investors can exploit their information advantage. By defi-
nition, the measure of capital gains/losses overhang is mostly affected by recent returns. Given
that a representative investor, or here mutual fund, is equally likely to be informed or unin-
formed, recent good (bad) news tends to be associated with exploitable information asymmetry
when the representative investor holds a large capital gains (losses) overhang. As mutual funds
are prohibited from short selling, good news with large capital losses or bad news with large
capital gains implies small price movement or low trading volume around the recent news, which
suggests that those stocks are probably immune to information asymmetry or that privately
informed investors fail to profit from their superior information. The combination of accrued
capital gains/losses overhang and recent news content conveys information on the degree of
information asymmetry and the characteristics of non-information-driven trades in the current
period. This paper predicts exactly the same result as is documented in Frazzini (2005): the
"overhang spread" is identified as the "maximum-profits" strategy, and, what's more, the alphas
of the "negative overhang spread" are statistically insignificant, while the disposition effect fails
to explain the zero "negative overhang spread."
1.6 Related Literature
The momentum anomaly remains one of the most puzzling phenomena in asset pricing owing
to its sizable magnitude and its fairly long duration.
A hypothetical portfolio of past strong performers earns a positive risk-adjusted return
over the ensuing three to twelve months, while the risk-adjusted return on holding past weak
performers is negative. The difference in alpha between the top- and the bottom-past-return-
decile portfolio is roughly 1% per month when based on the CAPM, and the magnitude becomes
slightly larger when based on the Fama-French three-factor model.
Most empirical anomalies, such as the size or the value effect, either disappear or attenuate
after their debut in the academic literature, as is surveyed by Schwert (2003). However, the
momentum alpha appears most strongly over the most recent decade after the publication of
the seminal paper by Jegadeesh and Titman in 1993. Moreover, Lewellen (2002) shows that
this cross-sectional effect exists not only among individual stocks but also among diversified
portfolios. The robustness and the pervasiveness suggest that behavioral biases are unlikely
the cause of momentum.
Risk-based models have not yet been successful at explaining momentum. Fama and French
(1996) claim that the three-factor model fails to explain away the momentum alpha because loser
stocks load more on SMB and HML than winners. The sizable magnitude of the momentum
alpha also precludes a rational explanation of the momentum anomaly through time-varying
risk premium(s). Lewellen and Nagel (2006) argue that the observed fluctuation in beta(s) can
hardly match the required scale of variation to explain a large unconditional alpha. Grundy
and Martin (2001) show that factor models can at best explain the variation in momentum
profits but not the mean.
A factor-based explanation would thus require the discovery and understanding of a new
risk factor beyond those commonly accepted. Berk, Green and Naik (1999) provide a model
that generates momentum over relatively long horizons as real investment decisions alter the
systematic risk of firms over time with some persistence. Johnson (2002) points out that return
is a convex function of the growth rate of cash flow. The curvature increases with the growth
rate, and so does the growth rate risk. Both papers provide a partial-equilibrium analysis and
imply a potentially highly nonlinear conditional factor model, but offer no guidance on finding
a new risk factor.
This paper provides a non-factor-based rational explanation, by emphasizing the interaction
between fixed transaction costs and information asymmetry. The simultaneous presence of the
two market imperfections leads to potentially magnified and prolonged impacts on price and
trading behavior.
Information asymmetry can be a crucial element in understanding momentum. The top
past-return-decile firms earn an astonishingly high return averaging more than 100% per an-
num, and the bottom past-return-decile firms lose about 40% on average. Huge gains/losses
accrued on one stock suggest that an enormous amount of information must have been disclosed
about the underlying firm during the prior one year, which must have encouraged information
arbitrage. High return volatility and high information asymmetry are likely to continue, though
possibly to a lesser extent, following the realization of extreme stock performance.
In a market with information imperfections alone, the price before risk adjustment cannot
deviate from the expected payoff based on the publicly available information set, as long as
there are sufficiently many rational uninformed investors who are not constrained to trade. A
model of information asymmetry hence cannot account for the momentum phenomenon without
incorporating some sort of irrationality or another market imperfection. 23
A number of recent studies argue that momentum trading strategies often require frequent
trading in disproportionately high cost securities. Chen, Stanzl and Watanabe (2001), Kora-
jczyk and Sadka (2004), Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004) gauge various transaction costs and
demonstrate that costs significantly reduce momentum profits. This paper contributes to the
existing literature by inquiring as to not only why momentum persists but also how momentum
comes into existence in the first place and why overall transaction costs are especially high for
momentum stocks.
Liquidity and momentum are intrinsically linked in my model. Extreme stock perfor-
mance predicts ensuing non-information-driven trades, so the liquidity cost derived from price-
independent adverse selection becomes prominent particularly for momentum stocks. The
aggravated cost of liquidity can lead to either positive or negative seemingly abnormal returns,
so illiquidity does not always imply positive "return premium."
PAstor and Stambaugh (2003) and Sadka (2006) explore several aggregate liquidity measures
as proxies for a liquidity risk factor. Both papers find that adding a liquidity risk factor reduces
the importance of momentum alpha. This study investigates liquidity and momentum from a
different angle and provides a non-factor-based explanation.
Ahn, Conrad and Dittmar (2003) extract a stochastic discount factor from a set of industry
portfolios. The nonparametric risk adjustment explains roughly half of momentum strategy
2 3 See Delong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990), Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirsh-
leifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), and Hong and Stein (1999).
profits. Their paper may have simply shifted the focus of the pricing puzzle to industry portfo-
lios, as in Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999). In addition, Ahn, Conrad and Dittmar (2003) show
that the dynamically weighted industry momentum portfolio lies beyond the mean-variance ef-
ficiency frontier formed by passive industry portfolios. Therefore, it is the dynamic nature of
industry momentum strategy, rather than the industry component, that is crucial. Consistent
with the empirical evidence, in this model, it is the adverse-selection cost of liquidity incurred
in share redistribution that drives momentum.
The current model generates positive return autocorrelation through the deviation in share
distribution. As the bias in share distribution corrects slowly, the return predictability will
appear more strongly over a longer horizon. Examining institutional holdings of momentum
stocks verifies that there is indeed strong persistence in the deviation of holdings, which explains
why momentum is manifest in monthly observations over a quarter up to a year.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper combines two commonly acknowledged market imperfections, information asymme-
try and fixed transaction costs, to derive a simple model of momentum. The returns achievable
by a marginal investor and the average returns observed via prices can differ widely in a market
with multiple trading frictions. By taking into account an extra dimension of uncertainty in
investment that is suppressed in a standard asset-pricing model, this study explains away both
the economic significance and the statistical significance of the momentum anomaly for the
sample period from 1983 to 2004.
The theoretical analysis in this paper is confined to the impact of asymmetric information
regarding idiosyncratic returns only. Although the simple model provides an adequate frame-
work to investigate the predictability of excess returns, a generalization of the model to allow
for differential information on macro factors is important from both the theoretical and the
empirical point of view.
The model predicts a cost of liquidity due to price-independent adverse selection, which
is jointly determined by the degree of information asymmetry and the buy/sell ratio of non-
information-driven trades. Both the PIAS ratio and the BOS ratio essentially reflect certain
aspects of liquidity. These two empirical proxies might appear similar to existing liquidity
measures, but the underlying theoretical motivation differs. This model suggests that liquidity
might well be a firm-specific characteristic, which, however, does not falsify the concept of
liquidity as an undiversifiable risk factor. The liquidity cost derived from price-independent
adverse selection can lead to either positive or negative seemingly abnormal return, so illiquidity
does not always imply positive "return premium." Examining a market that is subject to both
information asymmetry and fixed transaction costs may also shed light on our understanding
of market liquidity.
1.8 Appendices
1.8.1 Appendix A. Equilibrium - Proof of Proposition 1
This appendix proves the existence of an REE as defined in Definition 1 by presenting such an
equilibrium.
I will first propose an equilibrium characterized by the price function that is described in
Table 1.1 and the equilibrium holdings that are described in Table 1.2 (a) - (c). Next I will show
that the proposed equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium by looking closely at two representative
states: (0, 0, u, d) in which price is fully revealing and (-a, u, 0, d) in which price is not revealing.
The analysis for the other states is similar.
In addition, let q (X)t, ut) denote the conditional expectation of price E [Pt I Xt, ut]. In the
end of the proof, I will verify that the state space indeed consists of 36 states, and that the
q (Xt, ut) function satisfies the following as 0 < 0 << 1:
2 2 4a - uq(0,u) = -q(0,-u) = -q (-a, -u) = -q (a, u) = d0 0 2 (5u + a)
2a - U
q(-a,0) = -q(a, 0) = a-uOd,4a +u
2a
q (-a, u) = -q (a,-u) = 2a Od3u + 2a
and q(0,0) = 0.
Case I. (Xt, ut, ut+1,dt+1) = (0,0, u,d)
Optimization of Informed Investors Given prices, an informed investor j e [0, 1] faces
the following optimization problem:
max Et [x (dt + Pt)+ xt'+ [0 (dt+1 + pt+) - Pt] - h Ix+]
t+1
= X3E [dt + (dt+1 +Pt+1)] +Ej [(xJ+1 -xJ) [0 (dt+ 1 + Pt+1i) - Pt]] - Ah t I
subject to xi + 1 e [-a, +a].
Since price is fully revealing in the current state, the informed can infer Ut+1 and Xt' 1 from
price Pt and ut with perfect precision. Because the informed know all the relevant information
regarding dt+1 and pt+i that is available to the economy, his expectation of his wealth tomorrow
is independent of equilibrium allocation, i.e.,
Et [dt+1 + Pt+1 I xt 1] = EJt [dt+1 + pt+i], for any x+N E [-a, +a].
The first-order condition with respect to 4+1 when xt+l 3 0:
I "+1Et [fP (dt+ + Pt+1) - Pt] - h + 01 - 02=0.
Xd+1
01 and 02 are, respectively, the Lagrange multiplier for the holdings constraints: x >+1 -a and
x3 -< +a.
Given that p(0,O,u,d) = P[d+q(0,u)]-ý and X+ 1 = 0, Et [pt+ 1] = E [Pt+1 X i, Ut+1] =
q (0, u), so
(dt+l + Ei [pt+]) - Pt = < h.
It is immediate that X'+1 = 0, which also verifies that X+ 1 = 0.
Optimization of Uninformed Investors Given pt and Pt+1, an uninformed investor j E
[1, 1 + n] faces the following optimization problem:
maxE [Etx (dt + Pt) + x+1 [8 (dt+l + Pt+) - Pt] - CI '+l ]
t3+1 t
- x3t Et [dt + - (dt+, + pt+,)] + Ei [ x+- •t [ (dt+l + Pt+) - pt]]- C- x?+ -_? 0 ,
subject to xt+l E [0, a].
As all investors know ut at time t, uninformed investors can infer XI from price Pt and ut
with perfect precision. Moreover, in the current state, price is fully revealing, so the uninformed
also know dt+l, ut+1 and X•+1. Etj [dt+l + Pt+1 I x+1] is thus independent of *+1, and
Et [dt+l + Pt+1 I x+ 1 ] = Et [dt+1 + Pt+] , for any xt+ , E [0, a].
The first-order condition with respect to x4+ when xl = X :
Et [0 (dt+l + Pt+1) - Pt] + 01 - 02 = 0.
01 and 02 are, respectively, the Lagrange multiplier for the holdings constraints: xt+ 1 > 0 and
t+1 -< a.
Facing a fixed transaction cost c, an uninformed investor would like to buy only if pt <
Et [0 (dt+1 + Pt+l)] and would increase holdings up to his maximum capacity a whenever he
buys. Conversely, an uninformed investor would like to sell only if Pt > Et [f (dt+l1 + Pt+i)]
and would reduce holdings all the way to zero whenever he sells.
As E? [0 (dt+1 + Pt+l) - Pt] = ,
aEt [0 (dt+l + Pt+i) - Pt] - c = 0.
Therefore, for an uninformed investor with xt = 0, x'+1 = 0 or a in equilibrium. For an
uninformed investor with x = a, x•+1 = a.
Market Clearing After the current round of trading, the total supply of the asset is s + u.
The aggregate holdings of informed investors are 0. The aggregate holdings of uninformed
investors who previously hold a shares per account are still X+ 1 = Xtu = s - Xt = s. A
fraction of u of uninformed investors with xt = 0 will end up with x+1 = a, and the rest
of them will stay with xi =0. Since na > s + u + a, the fraction u indeed lies in [0, 1].
Therefore, the market clears, i.e.,
s+u=0+s+ax U x n- .
an - s a
Case II. (Xt, ut,ut+ ,dt+l) = (-a,u, O,d)
Optimization of Informed Investors Given pt and pt+i, an informed investor j e [0, 1]
faces the following optimization problem:
maxEt [xt (dt + pt)+ ++, [0 (dt+l + Pt+l) - Pt] - h +
xt+1
- x3E [dt + 0 (dt+1 + Pt+l)] + Etj [(xJ+1 - xi) [ (dt+1 + Pt+) - Pt]] -h x
subject to xi e [-a, +a].
Because the informed know ut and dt+1 and can infer X+ 1 but not ut+l from price pt,
E dt+ + Pt+1 Ix+] = dt+1 + [q (Xt+1, O) +q (X+ 1 , -au)], for any x1 E [-a, +a].
The first-order condition with respect to tlwhen xi " 0:
q (X z, O + q Xt -u) xSdt+1 + -- pt - h + 01 - 02 = 0.
2 xt+
01 and 02 are, respectively, the Lagrange multiplier for the holdings constraints: xt+1 -a and
x-+1 < +a.
Given that
p(-au,,d) (2 +- 7r4 - 7r -7r3) d + rlq (-a, 0) + 7r2 q (a, 0) ] cS 3q(-a,-u) rq(, 0, d) a,-u) -,
+7rq (-a, -u) + 7r4q (a, -u) a
u - u+2a - 2u and -42u+2awhere 7r, u , -72 = , 73 = , and W4 = .Ifx X1z= awhere 7"1 - 6u+4a- - 6u+4a' 6u+4a' 6u+4a f -
[ dt+1 + q (x+1,) q (x - Pt2
( q (a, 0) + q (a, -U) (7r2 +74 - 7r1 - r3) d 7r (-a, 0) + r2q (a, 0) --2 )+7r3q (-a, -u) + 7r4q (a, -u)
2 (7r, + 7r3) 8d - 7 r2 - 7r - q (a, 0) + -7rq (-a, -u) + (W4 - (a,-u) -a
S2 (7ri + 7r3) Od > h.
Therefore, xt+1 = a, which verifies that X+,l = a.
Optimization of Uninformed Investors Given pt and Pt+l, an uninformed investor j E
[1, 1 + n] faces the following optimization problem:
max E' xt (dt + Pt) + xt+1 [0 (dt+1 + Pt+1) - Pt] - CI- +
t+ 1
- XtE( [dd ± /3 (d+i ± Pt+l)] + Ef [(x• - x4) [' (dt+l ± pt+l) - pt]] - CI]x+ o0
subject to xt+l E [0, aJ.
As all investors know ut at time t, uninformed investors can infer Xt from price Pt and
ut with perfect precision. Uninformed investors take full account of available information
in deciding on their optimal demand. When the equilibrium price is not fully revealing, the
equilibrium allocation may convey additional information to the uninformed regarding the asset
payoff. In particular,
Et [d- + 0 (dt+1 + Pt+i)] : Et [dt+l + Pt+i I xt+1  x't .
In a symmetric equilibrium, Et dt•1 + pt+1 I x+1  x1 does not change with the size of
the adjustment +1 - xI because the mass of individual j is infinitesimally small and the size
of any individual adjustment lies within [0, a]. As a result,
dE? [dt+ + Pt+1 I x 3 4 X
=0.
The first-order condition with respect to x+1 when x+ 1 x3:
Etj [0 (dt+1 + Pt+1) I X+ - p + O1 - 02 = 0.
01 and 02 are, respectively, the Lagrange multiplier for the holdings constraints: X4 1 0 and
X41 <a.
Facing a fixed transaction cost c, an uninformed investor would like to buy only if Pt <
Etj [3 (dt+1 + pt+i) x+ = ] x and would increase holdings up to his maximum capacity a
whenever he buys. Conversely, an uninformed investor would like to sell only if pt > Et [3 (dt+l + Pt+1) x-x+1
and would reduce holdings all the way to zero whenever he sells. Therefore, in a stationary
equilibrium, an uninformed investor either holds zero or a shares.
In this case, price is not fully revealing. Conditional on XJ and ut, price stays fixed regard-
less of (d--l, ut+1). For an uninformed investor with x t = a, the conditional expectation:24
Et [P (dt+1 + Pt+m) I 4+1 = 4]
= 7r 1 (-d + q (-a, 0)) + 712 (d + q (a, 0)) + 7 3 (-d + q(-a,-u)) + 7r4 (d + q(a,-u)).
It follows that
Al C
E{ [3 (dt+l + Pt+l) Ix• 1 ,- pt = c
a
- -aEt [0 (dt+l + pt+m) - Pt Ix 1  4= a = C.
Therefore, for an uninformed investor with x• = a, xt+ = 0 or a in equilibrium.
24 This expectation will be verified to be indeed rational after the discussion on the market-clearing condition.
For an uninformed investor with xi = 0, the conditional expectation, 25
Et [0 (dt+1 + pt+j) I %I+, # xj] = E3 [0 (dt+1 + pt+i)]
1 1 1 1
= - (-d + q (-a, 0)) + - (d + q (a, 0)) + - (-d + q (-a, -u)) + - (d + q (a, -u)).
4 4 4 4
It follows that
(7r2  7r4 - 71r - 7r3)d +-7rlq (-a, 0) + 7r2q (a, 0) c
p (-a, u, 0, d) = p +-,+-raq (-a, -u) + 7r4q (a, -u) a
Et [0 (dt+l + Pt+l)] - Pt < - (7r2 7r4 - 17r1 - 3 ) d + 2p22d - ca
-(7" -2 + 4 -71 -71 -7r 3) d < 0.
Therefore, for an uninformed investor with x3 = 0, x3 = 0.
Market Clearing After the current round of trading, the total supply of the asset is s. The
aggregate holdings of informed investors are a. The aggregate holdings of uninformed investors
who previously hold zero shares remain to be zero. A fraction of +2 of uninformed investors
with xt = a will end up with xt+1 = 0, and the rest of them will stay with xt+l = a. Since
s - - a > 0, the fraction +2a indeed lies in [0, 1]. Therefore, the market clears, i.e.,
s=a+0+(s+u+a) 1- uta
Rational Expectations As is shown above, the fraction of the uninformed investors with
4 = a and x+ 1 = 0 is proportional to the change in the aggregate holdings of uninformed
investors. It follows that the probability of an uninformed investor with xt = a ending up
with xt+ 1 = 0 is proportional to the aggregate volume of trades that involve the uninformed.
Therefore, the posterior of a marginal uninformed investor with xt = a conditional on X+1 / xt
2 For an uninformed investor with x = 0, Et [, (dt+l + pt+l) I xj+l 7 xj] is an off-equilibrium expecta-
tion. I specify that Et [1 (dt+1 + pt+) x+1 xj] = Et [0 (dt+l + pt+l)]. It is reasonable to assume no
equilibrium state has both buy and sell orders stay unfilled. Therefore, Et [13 (dt+l + pt+1) I x+ 1  Xj] =
Eit [,6 (dt+l + Pt+1)].
(ut+ 1, dt+1) =
(0, -d),
(0, +d),
(-u, -d),
(-u, +d),
with probability of w1
with probability of ir2
with probability of 7r3
with probability of 7r4
=- For an uninformed investor with xi = a, given Pt, Xt = -a and ut = u,
Et [/3 (dt+l + pt+i) I xi= xi
= 71 (-d + q(-a, 0)) + r2 (d + q(a, 0)) + r3a(-d + q(-a,-u)) + 7r4 (d + q(a,-u)).
The analysis for other states is similar and is hence omitted from the proof.
The function q :x x Ut -* R, where x = {0, ±a} and Ut = {0, ±u}, is pinned down by the
following 9 conditions that are derived from Table 1.1:
q (0, 0) = 0, q (a, 0) = -q (-a, 0), q (0, u) = -q (0, -u),
q (0,-u)q(a,u) = -q(-a,-u),q(a,-u)= -q(-a,u),q(a,u) = /3 ' - u
''c 2a- 3u±2a 1
q(--a,0) -+ - u/3d- q(-a,u)+ 1- u -a ) 3 q (0,u)
a 4a+u 4u+4a 4 4u+4a
q(0, u) = (1- 32u-a/321
8 5u -+a
c 4a2-u) 3u+a 32u+a
a 5 )Od - 4 u+ q (-a, 0) - 4 g +aq (-a, u)],2(5u+a)/  45u+- a 45u+a
q (--a, u) = 1 + a
2a + 3u
[c 2a a U q(0,u)
-+d- 3q (-a, 0) + 32
a 3u + 2a 2a + 3u 2a+3u 2
The last three equations jointly determine q (-a, 0), q (0, u) and q (-a, u). Given that 0 < /3 <
should be:
1 and • << d,
2 2 4a - u
q(0, u) = -q(O,-u) = 3-q(-a,-u) = -q(a,u)= u •Od,
/ 2 (5u + a)
2a - u
q(-a,O 0) = -q(a, 0) = a uOd,4a + u
2a
q (-a, u) = -q (a, -u) = Od,3u + 2a
and q(0, 0) = 0.
Finally, an informed investor in this model holds either 0 shares when price is fully revealing
or ±a shares when price is not fully revealing. Therefore, XJ can be either 0 or ±a in equi-
librium, independent of (ut, ut+1, dt+1). In addition, dt+l is independent of (XI,u, ut+1), so
{ (Xi, Uutut+1,dt+1 ) } = xxUxD, where x = {0, +a}, D {+ld} and U = {(0, ±u) , (±u, 0) , (u, u)}.
The state space indeed consists of 36 states.
Q.E.D.
1.8.2 Appendix B. Return and Volume
Proof of Proposition 2. As is shown in the proof of Proposition 1, whenever an uninformed
investor j adjusts his stock holdings he is indifferent to an adjustment and no adjustment. Let
Ot denote Pr += xrt IPt . With probability Ot he ends up with a change of a shares, and
with probability (1 - Ot) he stays with the original holdings. His holdings vary even though the
equilibrium price is held unchanged. Conditional on an individual transaction, the expected
payoff Etj [rt+1 Pt, x+ 1  xt ] for a marginal uninformed investor is:
E I [rt+l #Pt, x•+l ] rtp]
SE [rt+l IPt, x + xt, (ut+, dt+l) Pr [(Ut+i,dt+l) Pt, t x]
(ut+ t,dt+)IPt
(ut+:,dt+ pt
(u1 + tdt+i)jpt
Pr [(ut+, dt+l) and xl+i 7 xl I Pt]
Etj [rt+l I Pt, (ut+l, dt+l)] Pr [xJ+l # xl pt]
•,r L ..I L ,Pr [(ut+1, dt+) I Pt] Pr x+i # x IPt, (ut+, dt+)]
=., E [rt+1 I Pt, uLt+1, at+1)j
(Ut+ 1t,dt+j)lIpt
SPr [x+# xj I pt, (ut+1, dt+ )]
= F rt+1 ot Pt]
In equilibrium, there are two possible scenarios: first, a fraction of uninformed nonshare-
holders buy a shares to accommodate liquidity sells, and the other uninformed investors do not
alter their stock holdings; second, a fraction of uninformed current shareholders sell a shares to
accommodate liquidity buys, and the other uninformed investors do not alter their stock hold-
ings. In both scenarios, given price Pt, the unsigned aggregate volume of trades that involve
uninformed investors, Vt 1 , is proportional to Pr [xl+ 7 xj Pt, (ut+1, dt+l) in a symmetric
equilibrium. Therefore,
Etj [rt+1 Ptl 1  x = E rt+1 Vtl Pt]
L E [ Vtj I Pt]
Since Et [rt+1 I Pt,X+1 #A x] = ,
E rt+l ' Pt = -
F [jVe1 IPtj I a
E E [F Vt] I EE [rt[IV I I Pt-1 Pr [pt-1]
Pt-1 I E [VtE [ Vtl]
_ S ~ ~tIV E [|VtU Pr-1E E [r V tu 1  [ P- P t-1]
Pt-1 E [IVtu Ipt-l 1 I E [Vtl]
cpt-1 t P -1
= E[Vtul I Pr [pt-11 = -.Pt-1 E [Vt"l] a
Q.E.D. m
Proof of Proposition 3. The correlation between the asset payoff rt and the demand
of the informed XJ must be nonnegative. The flow of noise trades should not correlate with
rt, given X t_ 1 , ut- 1 and the sign of Vtu. Therefore, the effective supply for the uninformed,
defined as s + ut - Xt, must be nonpositively correlated with rt, so is Vt' = s + ut - t - Xt_ 1 .
By definition, the positive sign of Vtu indicate buys from uninformed marginal investors and
vice versa. We thus have
coy [rt, IVlt I Xt 1 , ut- 1, VtU >0] < 0,
and
cov [rt, IVtu I ut-1, Vt < 0] > 0.
cov [rt, IVtuI I Xt_ , ut-I]
Scov [rt, IVtuI X-1, ut-1, Vtu > 0] Pr [Vtu > 0 Xt_ , ut-1]
+cov [rt, IVtu X/_l, ut-1, Vtu < 0] Pr [Vtu < 0 X )_I, ut-1 1
In equilibrium, if
Pr [Vtu > 0 I X 1 , ut-1] = Pr [VtU < 0 I X_ 1, ut-1],
then
coy [rt, I VtU Xt 1, utX-1 = cov [rt, Vtu X_-_ , ut-1, Vtu > 0]
cov [rt, Vt| Xt_1, ut-1, Vtu < 0] = 0.
If
Pr [Vt > 0 1 Xl, ut-1 < Pr [VtU < 0 Xi, ut-1] ,
then
cov [rt, Vt XLt1, ut-1, Vtu > 0 = 0 -4 coy [rt, IVt| Xt_ 1 , Ut-1] > 0.
Similarly, if
Pr [Vt > 0 1 X ,ut-1] > Pr [VtU < 0 I i Utt-1_ ,
then
cov [rt, Vtl I X_,ut-1, Vtu <0 = -- cov [rt, Vt I Xt 1 ,ut-1] < 0.
Q.E.D. .
By Proposition 2, if ~ 0,
E rt = |E [r ]l] = 0.
In reality, the indifference condition may not always hold. Without the indifference condi-
tion, coy (rt, 7ru) = 0. As long as there are sufficiently many investors who are uninformed but
rational, E [rt] = 0 after adjustment for risk, so
IE [rt7r]l = IE [rt]l = 0.
Recall that E [rr'] = 1. Therefore, the equality holds independent of the indifference condition.
Let's check if the equality also holds if we replace IVtUI with Vt = VtI + Vtnu. Vt refers to
the unsigned aggregate trading volume. Vtu refers to the unsigned aggregate volume of trades
that do not involve indifferent uninformed traders. Similarly, 7rt = -
If either E [VtuI] = 0 or E [Vt" ] = 0, as is shown above, we have
IE [rt7rt] =0.
Otherwise,
SVt" E [ Vt" [____] + VE r EtV
E [rt~tlI= E rtE[lVtl|] E [Vt] E [Vtnu ] E [Vt]
Since coy rt, t = 0 in general,
E [rtrt]| = E [rt Er-" + E [rt][[ ]
S t E [Vt] E [Vt
= Ert] EE[V]E [ Vt ]
The empirical analysis in this paper concerns the weighted average return of an arbitrage
portfolio. To derive the weighted average return for a zero-financing portfolio, I first compute
the weighted average for the long and the short portfolios separately and then subtract the
latter from the former. Therefore, even if coy rt, Et) 0, the biases should cancel out for
the zero-investment portfolio that consists of offsetting positions in a sufficiently large number
of stocks, unless there is any systematic difference in the volume-return relationship between
the long and the short portfolio. Moreover, the empirical results are based on monthly data
and should be exempt of high-frequency microstructure issues.
Because E[Vt' 0,1],]
£ [V [T01JE[rt~rtll <_ JE[rt]l,and E [rtlrt] I 0, if E [Vt] is sufficiently small.E[V ]
1.8.3 Appendix C. Return Autocorrelation
Proof of Proposition 4. In this model, if X' > 0 then X' = a, so
E [rt+l I rt > 0 and X' > 0] = E [rt+l I rt > 0 and Xt = a].
E [rt+1 I rt > 0 and Xt > 0] = E [rt+l I t > 0 and X t = a]
SE [rt+l I rt > O, Xt = a, ut] Pr [ut I rt > 0, Xt = a] .
utlrt>O and X'=a}
It is obvious that
{ut I rt > 0 and Xt = a} = {0, +u}.
By Proposition 2 and 3, for any possible Pt conditional on X- = a and ut = u,
E [rt+ 1 I Xt- = a, u t • u, pt] > 0.
Given that
E [rt+1 I rt > 0, X t = a, ut # u,pt] = E [rt+l I Xt = a, ut # u, pt],
if ut u then
E [rt+ 1 I rt > 0, X t = a, ut] > 0.
If ut = U,
E [rt+ I rt > 0, Xt = a, ut]
(utdt+1 rtX=aut{(Ut4 i,dt+1)Irt,>O,X'=a,ut}E [rt+1 I Xti = a, ut, ut+1,dt+l] Pr [(Ut+1,dt+i) I rt > 0,X t
2
= a, ut].
Since
CE [Tt+1 I Xt = a, ut = u, ut+1 = 0] = -E [rt+l I Xt = a, ut = u, ut+1 = --U] -
a
and under Condition (4) and (5)
Pr [(Ut+1,dt+i) I rt > 0,X t = a, ut = u] = Pr [(ut+1,dt+i) I Xi = a, ut = u] = 1
for any possible (ut+ 1 , dt+1 ) conditional on rt > 0, X' = a and ut = u,
E [rt+1 I rt > 0, Xt = a, ut = u] = 0.
E [rt+l I rt > 0 and XZ > 0] > 0.
As the model is constructed in a symmetric fashion, similarly, we obtain
E [rt+1 I rt < 0 and Xt < 0] > 0.
Q.E.D. m
Proof of Proposition 5. Similar to the proof of Proposition 4,
E [rt+1 I rt > 0 and Xt = 0]
= t,> ,X=
{Ut I Oo,xI=o}
E [rt+1 I rt > 0,X t = 0, ut] Pr [ut I rt > 0, Xj = 0] ,
F [rt+1 I rt > 0, X = 0, ut]
E{ (u•+ ,dt+ )Ir >Oxi=O ,u }E [rt+1 I rt > 0, Xi = 0, ut] Pr [(ut+, dt+l) rt > 0, Xt = 0, ut].
According to Table 1.1,
{((ut, ut+1,dt+l) I rt > 0 and X' =0}
S{(0, +u, d), (u, 0, d), (u,-u, Id), (-u, 0,d)}.
Since
Pr [ut+, = u rt >0, X =0, ut = 0] =Pr [ut+1 = -u rt > 0, X = 0, ut = 0]
and
and
E [rt+l I X = 0, (ut, ut+, dt+1,) = (0, u,d)]
c
= -E [rt+l I XI = 0, (ut, ut+1,dt+j) = (0, -u,d)] = -
E[rt+l rt > 0,Xt = 0, ut = 0] =0.
It is also obvious that
cE [rt+1 rt > 0, X = 0, ut U= u] <--
a
and
E [rt+1 rt >0, Xt =0, ut =-u] = caa
By symmetry,
Pr [X' =0, Ut = u] = Pr [X = 0,U = -u],
so it follows that
Pr [rt > 0,X) = 0,ut = u] > Pr [rt > 0,X = 0, ut = -u].
E [rt+l I rt > 0 and X- = 0] < 0.
As the model is constructed in a symmetric fashion, similarly, we obtain
E [rt+i I rt < 0 and X- = 0] > 0.
Q.E.D.
1.8.4 Appendix D. Benchmark Models
Benchmark I. Information Asymmetry Only
With no fixed cost, equilibrium states are characterized by (ut+l, d+1) E U x D, where U =
{0, ±u} and D = {±d}.
Proposition 6 There exists an equilibrium characterized by the following price function:
Pt = p (ut+l, dt+l) = ýdt+l.
Proof. Given the price function, an uninformed investor j E [1, 1 + n] can infer dt+l from
price Pt with perfect precision, and
3EJ [dt+1 + pt+i] - Pt = 0.
Therefore, any uninformed investor will be willing to hold any number of shares between 0 and
a.
For an informed investor j E [0, 1], xt+l = 0 as price fully reveals his private information.
The market always clears, as, for all t,
Xt = s + ut - X? = s + ut
and
0 < s + ut < na.
Q.E.D. m
Benchmark II. Fixed Transaction Costs Only
When there is a fixed transaction cost and no leakage of information regarding dt+ 1 , equilibrium
states are characterized by (ut, ut+l) E U, where
U= {(0, ±u) , (±u, 0), (±u, Tu)}.
Proposition 7 There exists an equilibrium characterized by the following price function:
-3+2/3 a' if (ut, Ut+1) = (0, +u)
+3-0 E
Pt =p(utut+) - 3+2,3a' if (ut, Ut+1) = (0,-u)Pt = p (ut, Ut+l) = +3 ES3+2/3 a if (ut, Ut+1) = (+±u, 0) or (+u,-u)3 E
3+2-3a' if (ut, ut+i) = (-u, 0) or (-u, +u)
Proof. For any investor j [0,1 + n],
OEj [dt+1 I 1 x] = 3Et [dt+1] = 0
and
3Ej [pt+l I ut, pt, xJI x
pt+1 3+ ,
Pt+ = 3+23 a'
3,3 c
/ (!E [p jut = 0] + qE [pt jut = -u])
0 (QE [Pt ut = 0] + ýE [pt ut = +u])
OEj [dt+1 + pt+l I ut, pt, x+ x] - pt =
2,3 c
= 2 ,
S3+23 a
= -±3+2!3a'
+ C,I a,
-4:
+ a ,
+.ý,
(ut, ut+1)
(ut, ut+1)
(ut, ut+1)
(ut, ut+1)
(0, +u)
(0,-u)
(+u, 0) or (+u, -u)
(-u,0) or (-u,+u)
(ut, ut+1) = (0, +u)
(ut,ut+1) = (0,-u)
(ut,ut+i) = (+u, 0) or (+u, -u)
(ut,ut+i)=(-u, 0) or (-u,+u)
Therefore, an "informed" investor j E [0, 1] always holds zero shares, because
JE dt+l + pt+l Iut,Pt, x+l x1 -Pt =- <h.
a
For an "uninformed" investor j G [1, 1 + n] with xi = 0,
Xt+l
0 or a,
0,
0,
0 or a,
(Ut, Ut+1)
(Ut, Ut+1)
(Ut, ut+1)
(Ut, ut+1)
(0, +u)
(0, -u)
(+U, 0)
(-u,0)
For an "uninformed" investor j E [1, 1 + n] with x3 = a,
t+1
a,
0 or
0 or
a,
(Ut, Ut+1)
(Ut, Ut+1)
(Ut, Ut+1)
(Ut, Ut+1)
(0, +u)
(0, -U)
(+u, 0)
(-U, 0)
The market always clears, as, for all t,
Xt= s + Ut-XJ= s + ut
and
0 < s + ut <na.
Q.E.D. m
or (+u,-u)
or (-u, +u)
or (+u,-u)
or (-u, +u)
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Table 1.3. Simulated Momentum Profits
Panel (A). Benchmark I - IA only
Past Ret 1 st Pd 2 nd Pd 3 rd Pd 4 th Pd 5 th Pd
0.5000 -0.0007 -0.0000 -0.0011 -0.0008 -0.0002
(0.00) (0.43) (0.54) (0.35) (0.36) (0.44)
0.5000 -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0006
(0.00) (0.52) (0.46) (0.48) (0.42) (0.39)
Panel (B). Benchmark II - FTC only
Past Ret 1 st Pd 2 nd Pd 3 rd Pd 4 t h Pd 5 t h Pd
1.0223 -0.0193 0.0126 -0.0069 0.0037 -0.0013
(0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.14) (0.35) (0.42)
1.0048 -0.0096 0.0069 -0.0032 0.0021 -0.0009
(0.00) (0.09) (0.22) (0.35) (0.37) (0.50)
Panel (C). IA and FTC
Past Ret st Pd 2nd Pd 3 rd Pd 4 t h Pd 5 th Pd
1.5208 0.0563 0.1536 -0.0788 0.0334 -0.0159
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
1.0240 0.0911 0.0490 -0.0254 0.0105 -0.0043
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.30)
Panel (D). IA and FTC (weighted by 7ru)
Past Ret 1s t Pd 2 nd Pd 3 rd Pd 4 th Pd 5 th Pd
1.5208 0.0171 0.0094 -0.0075 0.0029 -0.0016
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.05) (0.29) (0.34)
1.0240 0.0132 0.0012 -0.0030 0.0008 -0.0001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.38) (0.27) (0.45) (0.48)
Table 1.3 displays the simulated momentum profits arising in the dynamic model and in
two benchmark models with the following set of parameter values: = 0.5, d = 1, = 0.6, h =
0.011, and = 0.01. The statistics are derived from 100 simulations of a panel with 1000 stocks
and 100 periods. The table reports the average dollar gains per period (rt = (dt + pt) - Pt-1)
over the formation period (column 1), and one-period dollar gains over the first period up to
the fifth period (column 2 through 6) ensuing the portfolio formation. Each panel includes
simulated profits for the formation horizon of both one and two periods (row 1 and 3) and
also a statistic defined as the sample probability of a random variable having the same sign
as the respective mean (row 2 and 4). Panel (A) to (C), respectively, correspond to the first
benchmark model with information asymmetry only, the second benchmark model with fixed
transaction costs only, and the model with both information asymmetry and fixed transaction
costs. Panel (D) shows the simulated 7ry-weighted profits based on the same model as in Panel
(C), where 7r' is defined in Section 4.1 as the ratio of the aggregate volume of trades that
involve uninformed investors at time t - 1 to the expected volume.
Table 1.4. Momentum Profits, 1983-2004
Raw Returns
Equally-Weighted PIAS-Weighted A = EW - PW
V-Lfirst-month 1.537 0.622 0.915
t-stat (3.59) (1.42) (11.5)
W-Lsix-month-avg 0.870 -0.053 0.923
t-stat (2.32) (-0.13) (15.0)
CAPM-Adjusted Returns
Equally-Weighted PIAS-Weighted A = EW - PW
IV-Lfirst-month 1.552 0.655 0.897
t-stat (3.58) (1.47) (11.2)
IV-Lsixmonth-avg 0.832 -0.093 0.925
t-stat (2.19) (-0.23) (14.8)
FF3-Factor-Adjusted Returns
Equally-Weighted PIAS-Weighted A = EW - PW
V-Lfirst-month 1.871 0.964 0.907
t-stat (4.39) (2.19) (11.0)
V-Lsixmonth-avg 1.266 0.373 0.893
t-stat (3.45) (0.93) (13.9)
Table 1.4 compares the standard measure and the PIAS-adjusted measure of momentum
profits for the entire sample period from 1983 to 2004. The table shows monthly profits in
percentage terms and the corresponding simple t-statistics. The top panel reports momentum
profits without risk adjustment, and the next two panels, respectively, report risk-adjusted
estimates based on the CAPM and the Fama-French three-factor model. The momentum
portfolio that is formed at the end of month t takes a long (short) position in an equal-weighted
portfolio of stocks in the highest (lowest) decile sorted on cumulative returns compounded
over the past twelve months from month (t - 12) to (t - 1). The standard measure is simply
the difference in returns between the monthly rebalanced winner and loser portfolios. The
six-month average measures the monthly profits on a six-month rolling portfolio that in any
calendar month holds an equal proportion of the zero-investment momentum portfolios selected
in the previous six months. The PIAS-weighted average takes into account the adjustment for
price-independent adverse selection based on Proposition 2 and represents the return obtainable
by an uninformed marginal investor. Hence, the last column represents the bias in the standard
measure. Refer to Section 6.1.1 for a detailed description of how to construct the PIAS weights.
The sample is comprised of all ordinary common stocks of nonfinancial firms that are traded
on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, excluding stocks priced less than $5 on the formation date and
stocks in the smallest size decile (applying NYSE size decile breakpoints).
Table 1.5. Momentum Profits, 1994-2004
Raw Returns
Equally-Weighted PIAS-Weighted A = EW - PW
W-Lfirst-month 1.469 0.457 1.012
t-stat (1.86) (0.57) (8.13)
W-Lsix-month-avg 0.694 -0.348 1.042
t-stat (1.02) (-0.48) (10.7)
CAPM-Adjusted Returns
Equally-Weighted PIAS-Weighted A = EW - PW
IV-Lfirst-month 1.599 0.601 0.998
t-stat (2.01) (0.75) (7.93)
IV-Lsixmonth-avg 0.722 -0.326 1.049
t-stat (1.05) (-0.44) (10.7)
FF3-Factor-Adjusted Returns
Equally-Weighted PIAS-Weighted A = EW - PW
WV-Lfirst-month 1.956 0.969 0.988
t-stat (2.58) (1.25) (7.57)
WV-Lsix-month-avg 1.253 0.252 1.001
t-stat (1.95) (0.36) (10.1)
Table 1.5 compares the standard measure and the PIAS-adjusted measure of momentum
profits for the subsample period from 1994 to 2004. The table shows monthly profits in
percentage terms and the corresponding simple t-statistics. The top panel reports momentum
profits without risk adjustment, and the next two panels, respectively, report risk-adjusted
estimates based on the CAPM and the Fama-French three-factor model. The momentum
portfolio that is formed at the end of month t takes a long (short) position in an equal-weighted
portfolio of stocks in the highest (lowest) decile sorted on cumulative returns compounded
over the past twelve months from month (t - 12) to (t - 1). The standard measure is simply
the difference in returns between the monthly rebalanced winner and loser portfolios. The
six-month average measures the monthly profits on a six-month rolling portfolio that in any
calendar month holds an equal proportion of the zero-investment momentum portfolios selected
in the previous six months. The PIAS-weighted average takes into account the adjustment for
price-independent adverse selection based on Proposition 2 and represents the return obtainable
by an uninformed marginal investor. Hence, the last column represents the bias in the standard
measure. Refer to Section 6.1.1 for a detailed description of how to construct the PIAS weights.
The sample is comprised of all ordinary common stocks of nonfinancial firms that are traded
on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, excluding stocks priced less than $5 on the formation date and
stocks in the smallest size decile (applying NYSE size decile breakpoints).
Table 1.6. PEAD-Based Arbitrage Profits, 1983-2004
Raw Returns
Equally-Weighted PIAS-Weighted A = EW - PW
IV-Lfirst-quarter 0.588 0.231 0.357
t-stat (4.31) (1.46) (7.69)
W-Lsix-month
-
avg 0.430 0.016 0.415
t-stat (3.38) (0.10) (9.36)
CAPM-Adjusted Returns
Equally-Weighted PIAS-Weighted A = EW- PW
V-Lfirst-quarter 0.558 0.205 0.353
t-stat (4.06) (1.28) (7.51)
VW-Lsix-month-avg 0.397 -0.018 0.415
t-stat (3.09) (-0.12) (9.24)
FF3-Factor-Adjusted Returns
Equally-Weighted PIAS-Weighted A = EW- PW
WV-Lfirst-quarter 0.615 0.269 0.346
t-stat (4.42) (1.67) (7.19)
WV-Lsix-month-avg 0.493 0.093 0.400
t-stat (3.86) (0.63) (8.84)
Table 1.6 compares the standard measure and the PIAS-adjusted measure of PEAD-based
arbitrage profits for the sample period from 1983 to 2004. The table shows monthly profits
in percentage terms and the corresponding simple t-statistics. The top panel reports monthly
profits without risk adjustment, and the next two panels, respectively, report risk-adjusted
estimates based on the CAPM and the Fama-French three-factor model. The PEAD-based
arbitrage portfolio that is formed at the end of the announcement quarter takes a long (short)
position in an equal-weighted portfolio of stocks in the highest (lowest) decile sorted on the
latest publicly available SUE. The standard measure is simply the difference in monthly returns
between the quarterly rebalanced highest and lowest SUE portfolios. The six-month average
measures the monthly profits on a six-month rolling portfolio that in any calendar month holds
an equal proportion of the zero-investment arbitrage portfolios selected within the previous six
months. The PIAS-weighted average takes into account the adjustment for price-independent
adverse selection based on Proposition 2 and represents the return obtainable by an uninformed
marginal investor. Hence, the last column represents the bias in the standard measure. Refer
to Section 6.1.1 for a detailed description of how to construct the PIAS weights. The sample
is comprised of all NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ-traded firms that have at least ten consecutive
earnings observations on Compustat and have March, June, September or December fiscal-year
ends, but excludes those firm-quarter observations with earnings-announcement later than two
months after a fiscal quarter ends and those with stock price lower than $5 at the end of the
earnings quarter.
Table 1.7. PEAD-Based Arbitrage Profits, 1994-2004
Raw Returns
Equally-Weighted PIAS-Weighted A = EW - PW
W-Lfirst-quarter 0.363 -0.057 0.420
t-stat (1.81) (-0.24) (6.21)
W-Lsix-month-avg 0.217 -0.259 0.476
t-stat (1.15) (-1.17) (7.14)
CAPM-Adjusted Returns
Equally-Weighted PIAS-Weighted A = EW - PW
W-Lfirst-.quarter 0.393 -0.023 0.416
t-stat (1.94) (-0.10) (6.07)
W-Lsix-month-avg 0.227 -0.249 0.476
t-stat (1.19) (-1.11) (7.04)
FF3-Factor-Adjusted Returns
Equally-Weighted PIAS-Weighted A = EW - PW
W-Lfirst-quarter 0.448 0.045 0.403
t-stat (2.20) (0.19) (5.81)
W-Lsix-month-avg 0.312 -0.152 0.464
t-stat (1.63) (-0.68) (6.89)
Table 1.7 compares the standard measure and the PIAS-adjusted measure of PEAD-based
arbitrage profits for the subsample period from 1994 to 2004. The table shows monthly profits
in percentage terms and the corresponding simple t-statistics. The top panel reports monthly
profits without risk adjustment, and the next two panels, respectively, report risk-adjusted
estimates based on the CAPM and the Fama-French three-factor model. The PEAD-based
arbitrage portfolio that is formed at the end of the announcement quarter takes a long (short)
position in an equal-weighted portfolio of stocks in the highest (lowest) decile sorted on the
latest publicly available SUE. The standard measure is simply the difference in monthly returns
between the quarterly rebalanced highest and lowest SUE portfolios. The six-month average
measures the monthly profits on a six-month rolling portfolio that in any calendar month holds
an equal proportion of the zero-investment arbitrage portfolios selected within the previous six
months. The PIAS-weighted average takes into account the adjustment for price-independent
adverse selection based on Proposition 2 and represents the return obtainable by an uninformed
marginal investor. Hence, the last column represents the bias in the standard measure. Refer
to Section 6.1.1 for a detailed description of how to construct the PIAS weights. The sample
is comprised of all NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ-traded firms that have at least ten consecutive
earnings observations on Compustat and have March, June, September or December fiscal-year
ends, but excludes those firm-quarter observations with earnings-announcement later than two
months after a fiscal quarter ends and those with stock price lower than $5 at the end of the
earnings quarter.
Table 1.8. Predicting Return Momentum, 1985-2004
Panel (A). First-Month Returns
CAPM a FF3 a
P1 P3 P3-P1 P1 PS P3-P1
R1 -0.736 -1.685 -0.949 -0.729 -1.550 -0.822
t-stat (-2.19) (-4.80) (-4.62) (-2.37) (-5.03) (-3.98)
R10O 0.082 0.730 0.648 0.436 1.084 0.648
t-stat (0.23) (1.99) (3.09) (2.01) (4.61) (3.00)
Panel (B). Three-Month Average Returns
CAPM a FF3 a
P1 P3 P3-P1 P1 P3 P3-P1
R1 -0.715 -1.302 -0.586 -0.726 -1.176 -0.450
t-stat (-2.22) (-3.78) (-3.31) (-2.49) (-4.05) (-2.59)
RIO -0.027 0.596 0.623 0.381 0.958 0.577
t-stat (-0.08) (1.77) (3.55) (1.95) (4.61) (3.26)
Panel (C). Six-Month Average Returns
CAPM a FF3 a
P1 P3 P3-P1 P1 P3 P3-P1
R1 -0.656 -0.971 -0.315 -0.704 -0.881 -0.177
t-stat (-2.00) (-2.79) (-1.94) (-2.42) (-3.00) (-1.12)
R10 -0.251 0.358 0.609 0.153 0.748 0.595
t-stat (-0.72) (1.15) (3.98) (0.85) (4.21) (3.95)
In Table 1.8, stocks are sorted on the BOS ratio into three quantiles within the highest (R10)
and the lowest (R1) deciles of cumulative returns compounded over the past twelve months.
See section 6.2.1 for a detailed account of the BOS ratio. For the R1 portfolio, P3 (P1) denotes
the subgroup that has the highest (lowest) BOS ratio. For the R10 portfolio, P3 (P1) denotes
the subgroup that has the lowest (highest) BOS ratio. The left panel reports CAPM-adjusted
returns in percentage terms, and the right panel reports Fama-French three-factor-adjusted
returns in percentage terms. Panel (A), (B) and (C) present results over a holding period
of one, three and six months, respectively. The sample is comprised of all ordinary common
stocks of nonfinancial firms that are traded on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, excluding stocks
priced less than $5 on the formation date and stocks in the smallest size decile (applying NYSE
size decile breakpoints).
Table 1.9. Summary Characteristics of BOS-sorted portfolios, 1985-2004
R1 - Past-Weak-Performance Stocks
P1 P3
BOS ME Rplr BOS ME Rplyr
Mean -2.16 0.94 -5.24 6.10 0.71 -5.17
Median -1.50 0.29 -4.66 3.75 0.22 -4.64
Std. Dev. 2.14 2.18 1.99 8.05 1.95 1.91
R10 - Past-Strong-Performance Stocks
P1 P3
BOS ME Rplyr BOS ME Rplyr
Mean 7.95 0.72 8.18 -2.04 2.07 7.54
Median 5.34 0.29 7.43 -1.27 0.51 6.83
Std. Dev. 8.31 1.51 2.67 2.50 5.54 2.29
Table 1.9 presents the summary statistics for some characteristics of the subportfolios. In
particular, the numbers shown in the table are the time-series average of respective summary
statistics for the monthly-rebalanced subportfolios. Stocks are sorted on the BOS ratio into
three quantiles within the highest (R10) and the lowest (R1) deciles of cumulative returns
compounded over the past twelve months. See section 6.2.1 for a detailed account of the BOS
ratio. P3 (P1) denotes the subgroup that has the strongest (weakest) momentum within the
R1 or the R10 portfolio. "BOS" stands for the BOS ratio (in percentage terms). "ME" stands
for the market value of equity (in million dollars). "Rplyri" stands for the average return over
the past twelve months (in percentage terms). The entire sample is comprised of all ordinary
common stocks of nonfinancial firms that are traded on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, excluding
stocks priced less than $5 on the formation date and stocks in the smallest size decile (applying
NYSE size decile breakpoints).

Chapter 2
Inefficient Liquidity Provision under
Information Asymmetry
This paper presents a simple model that features a market with information asymmetry and
imperfect competition. In particular, the model examines how the market absorbs a publicly
known supply shock. The informed in this model always under-provides liquidity due to the
noncompetitive nature of the market. Even when price fully reveals private information, the
market does not attain perfect risk sharing. An investor appears more risk-averse than in
a canonical model, as a liquidity trader faces a buy price distribution that is highly skewed
toward the upper end and a sell price distribution that is highly skewed toward the lower end.
Moreover, uninformed investors display the "disposition effect:" to unload shares when price
is high and to load shares when price is low. The magnitude of these apparent "behavioral
biases" depends on the recent performance of the individual stock, as information asymmetry
induces trading frictions and causes inertia in share distribution. The history dependence at the
individual stock level distinguishes this information story from existing models of heterogeneous
preferences. Examining the effects of information imperfections on share allocation in addition
to price behavior offers insights on stock return behavior.
2.1 Introduction
This paper investigates how information asymmetry induces inefficiency in share distribution
and in turn affects stock return behavior. Previous studies on information imperfections have
focused on market efficiency in collecting and revealing private information.1 Some have further
explored its implications on price volatility and risk premium. The current study contributes to
the literature by extending the analysis to the quantity dimension. Examining share allocation
in addition to price behavior generates interesting implications for both cross-sectional and
time-series return behavior under information asymmetry.
This paper presents a simple model that features a market with information asymmetry
and imperfect competition. The model focuses on how the market absorbs a publicly known
supply shock. The interesting questions include whether it is informed or uninformed investors
who trade to accommodate liquidity trades, how the cost of liquidity varies accordingly, and
how liquidity conditions predict return.
To our surprise, the informed in this model always under-provide liquidity due to the non-
competitive nature of the market. Given an exogenous increase in the supply of the asset the
informed buy disproportionately less relative to the uninformed in absorbing the liquidity sells;
and vice versa. Even when price fully reveals private information, the market does not achieve
perfect risk sharing.
For an investor who is forced to liquidate his holdings, the distribution of his liquidation
price is highly skewed toward the lower end, with unbounded downside but bounded upside;
and vice versa. Price falls with expected payoff and falls further at the lower end, because the
uninformed bear excessively more and more risk as price falls and thus demand a higher and
higher risk premium. As price rises with expected payoff, the informed will be reluctant to
push the price up further as the marginal profits of informed trades diminish.
This simple model of information asymmetry offers interesting implications on investment
behavior and return behavior, similar to those in the growing literature of behavioral finance.2
'See, for example, Grossman (1976), Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Hellwig (1980), Admati (1985), Kyle
(1985), Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), Kyle (1989), Easley and O'Hara (1992), Holden and Subrahmanyam
(1992), Romer (1993), Wang (1993), Caplin and Leahy (1994), Foster and Viswanathan (1996), Back, Cao and
Willard (2000), Vayanos (2001), and Brunnermeier (2005).
2See, for example, Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001).
An investor appears more risk-averse than in a canonical model, as a liquidity trader faces a
buy price distribution that is highly skewed toward the upper end and a sell price distribution
that is highly skewed toward the lower end. Moreover, uninformed investors display the
"disposition effect:" to unload shares when price is high and to load shares when price is
low. The magnitude of these "behavioral biases" depends on the recent performance of the
individual stock, since information asymmetry induces trading frictions and causes inertia in
share distribution. The history dependence at the individual stock level distinguishes this
information story from existing models of heterogeneous preferences. 3
Like Wu (2007), this paper provides an information-based explanation of return autocor-
relation. Unlike Wu (2007) that predicts a state-dependent positive return autocorrelation,
the current model predicts a state-dependent negative return autocorrelation. The two pa-
pers however do not contradict but rather complement each other. The return predictability
in Wu (2007) results from the predictability of liquidity trades under information asymmetry.
Seemingly abnormal returns arise when price becomes dysfunctional in uncovering information-
induced distortions in aggregate trades. In contrast, the return predictability in this paper
derives from the predictability of variation in risk premium. As a result, return can appear
positively or negatively autocorrelated, depending on the weight of systematic risk relative to
idiosyncratic risk, the noisiness of non-information-driven trades, and etc. The relevant horizon
of the autocorrelation can also vary with the nature of information.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3
characterizes a rational expectations equilibrium. Section 4 presents novel model implications.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2.2 Model
This one-period model examines how differentially informed investors trade to absorb a publicly
known liquidity shock, aiming to understand the role of liquidity provision by different types
of investors under information asymmetry and its implications on asset return behavior.
A typical market structure under information asymmetry consists of three parties: informed
3 See, for example, Chan and Kogan (2002).
traders, uninformed traders, and liquidity traders who trade for non-informational motives.
The informed profit from trading with both uninformed and liquidity traders. The uninformed
lose to the informed, but exploits liquidity traders to break even. The cost of liquidity born
by liquidity traders thus depends on the specification of market structure which includes the
transparency of liquidity shocks among many other things.
This model investigates a case at one extreme of the spectrum, in which the liquidity
shock is perfectly known to the public before trades take place. Such specification tends to
minimize the cost incurred on liquidity trades and to limit the profits of informational trades.
Kyle (1989) provides analyses of the other extreme. By removing uncertainty regarding the
liquidity shock, this study underscores the role of information in share reallocation. In contrast,
previous studies on information asymmetry focus solely on the price dimension and investigate
how efficiently price reveals private information. This study expands the previous analysis by
shifting our attention to the quantity dimension. I will examine how information asymmetry
affects share allocation between the informed and the uninformed and its consequences on the
price behavior.
The simple economy has only two assets, one risky asset and one riskfree asset. Without
loss of generality, let the riskfree rate be zero. The supply of the riskfree asset is assumed to
be perfectly elastic. The risky asset pays a dividend d per share:
d=z+e, where z~ N(0, a0 ) and e~N (0, a 2 ).
z and E are mutually independent. z follows a centered normal distribution with variance of
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aZ . e follows a centered normal distribution with variance of a 2 . The aggregate supply of the
risky asset is S + u number of shares, where S is a positive constant. u denotes the exogenous
liquidity shock that hits the market before the current round of trading. All investors observe
u perfectly before trading. A positive u represents a noise sell of u shares; while a negative u
represents a noise buy. Assume S + u > 0 always holds.
There are two types of investors, one informed investor and N uninformed investors. The
informed investor observes z before trading, but the uninformed investors do not. Each indi-
vidual investor is initially endowed with S shares of the risky asset and zero shares of the
riskfree asset.
All investors share the same CARA utility function:
- exp (-caW1),
where W 1 refers to the total wealth at the end of the period.
Finally, all the uninformed investors behave competitively as price-takers, but the informed
investor takes into account monopoly power over his private information and takes into consid-
eration his price impact while deciding on his portfolio choice. As is discussed in Kyle (1985),
it is plausible to model the informed trader as behaving strategically for the following reasons.
First, stylized facts suggest best-informed traders are often large. Second, introducing imper-
fect competition resolves the schizophrenia problem. Otherwise, under perfect competition,
equilibrium prices reveal so much of private information that profits from informational trades
are small and there would be little incentive to acquire costly private information in the first
place.
For simplicity, this model groups all informed investors together as one monopolist. The
parameter N should not be interpreted literally as the ratio of the population of the two
differentially informed investors, but it instead captures the joint effect of various factors that
determines the relative risk-bearing capacity of the uninformed investors as a whole versus that
of the informed.
2.3 Equilibrium
A few more notations are in order. Let p denote the price of the risky asset. xt denotes
the demand of the risky asset by a type-k investor at time t, t = 0, 1. k = i if an investor is
informed; otherwise, k = u. By assumption, x = XU - S0 I +N"
Definition 2 A rational expectations equilibrium consists of a price function p = p (z), the
demand of the informed investor xi (z), the belief of an uninformed investor g (p), and the
demand of an uninformed investor xu (p), such that
1. given the demand of an uninformed investor xu (p), xi (z) maximizes the expected utility
of the informed investor;
2. given the price p, an uninformed investor forms his rational belief g (p), and xu (p) max-
imizes his expected utility;
3. the market clears:
S + U = x (z) + Nx (p(z))
Proposition 8 There exists a rational expectations equilibrium as is defined above.
By construction, the model is symmetric for positive (u > 0) and negative (u < 0) liquidity
shocks. Let us first look at the case in which u > 0. Assume N(2+N)>z > 1 so that a closed
form solution can be obtained to the second-order approximation. Note that the existence of
an equilibrium does not require this restriction on parameters.
Equilibrium Price
For u > 0 and N(2+N)• > 1, there exists one equilibrium characterized by the following price
function p = p (z) :
z - oau Suf() for z E (-oo, zRp=[I + - (z)]z- (2  + , u for z C zR]P zR oau2(lSN-UN) fo )R+ )
The constant zR and the function f (x) are defined as follows:
zR N(2+N) az.ZyOr2U
f (x) z + (2 + N) u x- xN g xR - z ] +±a2#ln(x 7i 0)
Xx x i- + U ( 1 _
for x (4,x R]andxR ex,±+ N1 +
Note that
f' (x) = (2  > (x + ) 0 if x < x < x u +
N x - X) - (2+ N)
The function f (x) is indeed invertible over (4X, xR]. Moreover, f' (x) can be rewritten as
f'(x) =-a2  - 2+N-
so
f"(x) =ao 2  2+N > 0.
N (x - x) 2
As f (x) is convex in x, f 1 (z) must be concave in z. Therefore, over the range of z E (-oo, zR],
price fully reveals the private information regarding z. Price increases with z; and furthermore
price is a concave function of z.
Let pu denote the price at which all signal z E (zR, +oo) pools, i.e., pU = zRa 2 (S + -2
Let pR denote the highest price at which price fully reveals the private signal, i.e., pR =
zR±(1+N)+ +
z1+N N(2+N) U
It can be easily verified that pu is higher than pR. To sum up, the equilibrium price function
consists of two regimes. Over one regime, price fully reveals the private information regarding
z. Price falls as z falls and drops at a faster pace. Over the other regime, price is completely
uninformative. Figure 3.1 shows the mapping from z to p.
When a liquidity sell of u shares hits the market, the equilibrium price will be perfectly
informative if z e (-oo, zR], but will be completely insensitive to private signal over the region
of [zR, +oo). Even though the distribution of the original private signal z is normal and
symmetric, the distribution of the equilibrium price is asymmetric - unbounded at the lower
end and bounded at the upper end. Compared to the normal distribution of z, the price
distribution should have a thicker tail at the lower end because price there is concave in z.
Figure 2-1: Price Function, p (z)
Demand of an Uninformed Investor
The uninformed investors infer others' private information from the market-clearing price. They
form the following rational belief 0 (p) regarding z:
z = P + ae2 S+u-g', p)
z = p -+ a2 S+u-xR
0 (p)= z ,- N (0, aC) truncated at zR,
z ~ N (0, U2) truncated at A (p) where
(A (p) + )= p + ± OX 2(NS + (N±)u
e Ni+1 ((N+2)Nf
The function g (x) is defined as follows:
if p < pR;
if p E (pRpU)
if p = pU;
if p > pU.
R 2 S+u-xR x2(x0) 2IN_ (-_ 4g (x) = z R aS + au 2 In -- a ( x - x ) .NNXR - X N
( Rz 2 S+u-x Rg (xRz = zN- au  g p,
r
4Note that
Note that in equilibrium price either lies in (-co, pR] or equals pU . Forp E (pR, pU) U (pU, +oo),
0 (p) specifies the off-equilibrium belief.
Given the belief, an uninformed investor behaves as a competitive price taker and chooses
x' to maximize
E[- exp (-a (xd - (x' - x) p))].
If p < pR, price fully reveals what z is, and the expected utility becomes
- exp a z - a92 (X)2 - ( -
S+u-g- 1 (p)
It immediately follows that the optimal demand x =+u-- N
If p E (pR, pU), the uninformed would believe z = p + a 2 S+u-xR so they would chooseN s they would choose x•
to maximize
- exp (-a (xz - ao2 ()2 - (x
Hence, the optimal demand of an uninformed investor would be S+U-XR if price falls between
N
p and pU
If p -= pu, the conditional distribution of z is a truncated normal distribution bounded
lim. g (x) -* -oo,
and
g'(x)= -r 2 -(1+N) >O0ifx< l • .
Hence, N (p) is well defined for _+N
Hence, g-1 (p) is well defined for p <; pR.
below at zR. The expected utility becomes 5
'ý -exp (-a (xz - a2 (x) 2 - (x - X)p) exp (-•) dz
f:exp-- dz
1 ~0 ep - + CiozzX 
2 z
( ( 1 ))f:R exp - ---
+azl d -
exp -a -( a (U2 + 2) (xu)2 - (x- ~- U+
fRexp 
- d
-exp{-C [(zR+ ±z ) XU auo2 (xu)2 - (x -xU)p}.
Clearly, the objective function is concave in x'. The optimal demand of an uninformed investor
thus satisfies
z R = pU + au2 XU
zR + Uz pU S u (1 + N)
_"= +V( +Nx aa2 = 1 + N N (2 + N)
If p > pU, the uninformed would believe the conditional distribution of z is a truncated
normal distribution bounded below at A (p). Recall that
(p +a2 P+a2(S +(N+1)u)/
A(p) N +1 (N+2)
and 1 < A. There exists A (p) such that the condition above holds, and A (p) > ZR and
A' (p) > 0 for p > pU. Similar to the case in which p = pu, an uninformed investor would
choose xu = S + u(1+N)1 r+'-" N(2+N)
5The last equality follows from A() > 1. Recall the fact that, for any a > 0,
a Iasfey
a exp a < exp - dx < - exp ( .
1+ a2 2 a a
If a is sufficiently large,
exp - dx exp
0 2 aa 2
To sum up, the demand curve for an uninformed investor is as shown below:
s +u-g-1(p) if p< pR;
N
XU (p) S+N XR  if p E (pR,pU);
S +u(+N) if p > PU.
1+N + N(2+N),
The demand of an uninformed investor decreases with price.
Demand of an Informed Investor
The optimal demand of the informed investor is as shown below:
( f-1 (z), if z <zR;X• (Z) = 7
x U ,  if z E (z , +00).
Given the demand curve of uninformed investors, the residual supply for the informed should
be
g-1 (p), if p < pR;
x (p) = x if XRp (pR,pU)
-- =l N+ U2 ' if p Ž PU.
As is discussed previously, the supply curve is upward sloping. Facing this residual supply curve,
the informed investor strategically choose his demand xj upon receiving private information
about z. The informed who perfectly observes z decides on x' to maximize his expected utility:
- ex ~ ~ - !U2 (Xi)2 _ (Xi -4)
-exp [-a (x z - 'a2 1 -2
Equivalently, he decides on x" to maximize
1 2 z1
x 1 - 2Q U1 () - (2_ -X ) P (i),
or he decides on p to maximize
= (p) z - -2 2 () .
First of all, the informed will not choose p within (pR, pu) U (pU, +oo), because =) 0
for p E (pR,pU) U (pU, +oo). Ifp e (pR,pU), the informed could improve his utility by choosing
p = p. Similarly, ifp E (pU, +oo), the informed could improve his utility by choosing p = pU.
Therefore, in equilibrium, xR and x U must correspond to pR and pU, respectively. Rewrite the
residual supply for the informed by expressing p in terms of 4x :
-oo, if x1 _ x;
g(xi), if x < xi< xR;
(Xi) = +O±, if xR < Xi xU
pU, if x = x;
+oo, if Xu < x .
Either p (x) = +oo or p (x) = -oo implies that the informed cannot achieve the intended
position x in equilibrium.
The informed takes into consideration the price impact of his demand and considers the
following first-order derivative 7r (M) with respect to 4x
I' (4)= z- _ 2X-p-i(x1-)p' (_).
In addition, the second-order derivative of 7r () with respect to x'
Wr" (xi) = -a0, 2 _ 2p' (xi) - (xi - 0)p" (4).
Note that, for x E (x i, xR],
x12-[ u  IbN],p' (X,) = g' (X,) = - -1 -)
and
aU 2  u
p" (xi) = g" (xi) = - - x@2
N ( 04)
Substituting p' (xý) and p" (xi) into -r" (xi), we obtain
2 N + -x7rt(Xil) --- •2N x1 - x0
That is to say, the objective function is concave in x" within the range of xi e (4x,xR].
The informed investor would prefer to buy more shares at a higher price if z > aa 2, +
p + (x - x4) p' (x) and p < pR, and vice versa. Any x4 that satisfies z = a2i + p +
(x• - x) p' (x) should maximize 7r (x4) within (xi, xR]. Next I show such xI also maximizes
7r (x) globally for the given z.
First, let us look at the case with z = zR. Recall that
ZR N (2+N) a2
and
g (xR) = zR _ a 2 S + u - xN
Replacing p with g (xR) in 7r' (xR), we know that the first-order condition holds, i.e., 7r' (x) = 0,
for z = zR. To verify that xR maximizes -r (x) globally when z = ZR , we need to check that
7r (XR, ZR) Ž .r (XU, ZR).
= 7r (x R ZR) - ( U 7 
U UR)
12 
0
-(x U) Z [(V)2 - ()ar2 ] - (U) -:_ ))R + (U -4 PU
(2 + N) +1 X+X 2+N : + N 2+N
U 2 U R 122 R UV 2 V2+N
(2+N) 2+N 2a (x + X ) +2+N N(2 + N)
=0
The informed investor is indeed indifferent between xR and xU. Therefore, xR maximizes 7r (x)
when z = z R .
2 1 2- 0
Next, for any z < zR, there exists a x such that 7r' (x) =
7r(XR, ZR) = r (XU, ZR),
0 and g (x) • p . Since
r (xR, z) = 7r (x, ZR) + xR (Z - zR),
and
r (xU, z) = 7r (xu zR) + XU (z - zR),
therefore,
r(x R,z) - .7r (xU,Z) = (X R- xU) (z -z R) >0.
That is to say, x maximizes 7r (x) for the given z.
Finally, for any z > zR, there exists no x such that 7r' (x) = 0
or xU maximizes 7r (x, z). Since 7r (xR, zR) = 7r (xU, zR),
r (xR, z) = 7r (xR, zR) + xR (z - ZR),
and g (x) < pR. Either xR
and
r (xU, z) = r (xU, z R) + Xu (z - z R),
therefore,
r (x , z) - r (xU, z) = (x - XU) (z - zR) < 0.
That is to say, x U maximizes 7r (x) for the given z.
It has thus been verified that the optimal demand of the informed investor is as shown
below:
if z < z;R.
if z E (zR, +oo).
To conclude the proof of the existence of an equilibrium, I show that the suggested belief
0 (p) is indeed rational. The uninformed investors make correct inference based on price.
When z E (zR, +oo), the informed investor demands xU shares, and each uninformed
investor must have S+u-X S (+N) shares so that the market clears. The marketNclearing price is therefore p + pN)
clearing price is therefore p = pU
f -1 (Z),Xi (Z)= U
,
When z < zR, the informed investor demands x = f- 1 (z) < xR shares, and each uninformed
investor must have N shares so that the market clears. The market clearing price must
be p = g(x) < g (xR) = pR. Because f (x) - g(x) = a 2 I [S + u - x],
z = f(x)=g(x)+a2 1[S + u - x]N
21 -1
= p + 2N [S+u- g (p),
which is indeed the conjectured belief of the uninformed for p 5 p . Hence, if z < zR, the
market clearing price will be lower than pu. As a result, only if z > zR, the market clears at
price p = pU. In fact, given p = pu, the uninformed believes that z follows a truncated normal
distribution, N (0, a2 ) truncated below at zR.
The proof of Proposition 8 is thus complete. It is worth emphasizing that although the
model can have multiple equilibria there exists no equilibrium in which price fully reveals
the private information regarding z. Perfect public knowledge of liquidity shock u does not
guarantee perfect price revelation. To present a formal proof of this claim, I will first introduce
a lemma as follows.
Lemma 1 If price fully reveals the private information regarding z, the demand curve of an
uninformed investor must be strictly downward sloping.
Proof by Contradiction. Assume to the contrary that the demand curve is not strictly
downward sloping, i.e., there exists a pair (pl, P2) such that Pl > p2 and xu (Pl) Ž xu (ps). The
2 U ()>9(p)Ineulbim
expectation of the uninformed must be 0 (p) = p + a2x1, so 0 (pl) > 0 (p2). In equilibrium,
z = 0 (p). Let zl and z2 denote 9 (Pl) and 9 (P2), respectively. Clearly, zl > z2.
Now consider the optimization of the informed investor. It follows that
W (pl, zl) > 7r (p2 , Z1) ,
and r (pI, z2 ) < ir (P2 , z 2). -
However,
7" (pI, Z2) = 7r (pl, Z1) + (Z2 - Z1) [S + U - Xu (Pl)]
> 7 (p2, Z) + (Z2 - Z1) [S + U - xu (pI)]
> 7r(p2, ZI) (Z2 - ZI) [S + U - x (p2 )]
= (P2, Z2) ;
that is to say,
7 (p1, z2) > 7r (P2, Z2) ,
which contradicts
7r (P1, Z2) < 7r (P2, Z2)"
The initial assumption thus generates contradictory predictions. Therefore,
dxu (p) < 0< 0.
dp
U
Proposition 9 The impossibility of perfect price revelation.
Proof by Contradiction. Assume to the contrary that there is an equilibrium in
which price perfectly reveals private information. According to Lemma 1, p must strictly
increase with z, and xu must strictly decrease with p, and p must strictly increase with xi.
Consider the inverse function p (x) of the informed investor's demand function xI (p). p (x)
must simultaneously satisfy the following conditions:
Rational expectation by the uninformed: z = p (x) + oja2S+Nx
FOC for the informed: z - au2x - p - (x - x) p' (x) = 0;
SOC for the informed: -au 2 - 2p' (x) - (x -4x) p" (x) < 0.
The first two equations above jointly pin down the functional form of p (x) :
2 S + u-(1 + N)x p,
N (x - x)0 =~x
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p(Sx) = C 2 [S+u- (1+N)x4 n Xi I-1+N1P (x) + Q2 Y •- ZMx ,
N N ]'
where C is a constant determined by boundary conditions. Substitute the solution for p (x)
into the SOC:
-aor 2 - 2p' (x) - (x -4) p" (x)
-a2 [S+u+(1+N) x-2(1 +N)x +1
N(x-x) xi)
If S+u+(+N)X-2(1+N)x> _ -1 or if xi < x S+u+ , the SOC holds; otherwise, p (x) is not
compatible with the informed investor's objective. Therefore, in the equilibrium with perfect
price revelation,
S + U +4X
x < 2+ and
2+Np(• = c + ,  S + u -(1+ N)x lb_ o 1+
p (x) = C + oaNl u- 2
Since z = p + .2 S+-x, z must be bounded above by some finite constant. However, z
follows a normal distribution that does not have an upper bound. Therefore, there exists no
such equilibrium in which price fully reveals private information. *
2.4 Model Implications
2.4.1 Inefficient Liquidity Provision
Kyle (1985) characterizes and quantifies liquidity using concepts including tightness, depth,
and resiliency. Liquidity nevertheless remains to be an elusive concept. Finance professionals
find the Kyle concepts extremely useful in analyzing high-frequency price behavior or market
microstructure issues. The concepts however fail to apply to liquidity-related issues of a
relatively longer horizon. In particular, recent empirical studies suggest that market liquidity
can be relevant in determining return predictability at the monthly or the quarterly frequency.
This paper employs the same framework as in Kyle (1989), which builds upon the canonical
setup in Grossman (1976). To further our understanding of liquidity, this paper interprets
liquidity as the easiness of transacting shares among investors. In particular, I explore how
information asymmetry prevents efficient distribution of shares among investors or in other
words how information asymmetry induces frictions in trading and distorts ownership allocation.
Understanding the role of information in asset reallocation contributes to our understanding of
relatively longer-run market liquidity and its implications on returns.
Predicting the flow of trades, either the direction or the volume, is extremely difficult at
higher frequencies, but can be less difficult at lower frequencies. The degree of uncertainty
about non-information-driven trades is a key element in models of information asymmetry.
This model removes the noisiness of non-information driven trades and can potentially generate
results applicable to longer-run phenomena.
Proposition 10 The informed investor under-provides liquidity, i.e.,
i -41- 2+N 1+N
Perfect risk-sharing implies the informed investor should absorb at least a fraction of 1
of the total liquidity shock u. In contrast, this model suggests that the informed at most takes
in a fraction of 1 The informed under-provides liquidity, while the uninformed plays a
crucial role in liquidity provision. This inefficiency in share distribution worsens in low payoff
state in which the uninformed trades to accommodate most of the liquidity needs.
Proposition 11 The holdings of the informed investor x' increases with z.
Recall that for u > 0 the demand of the informed who observes z:
Sf-1 (z), ifz<zR ;X1(Z) =/-
xU, if z e (zR , +oo).
f- 1 (z) is monotonically increasing in z and is a concave function of z. If u < 0, the demand
curve will consist of a mass point for z E (-0oo, z<o) and a region of x = fuo (z) for z - zŽ
where Z <O and fu<o can slightly differ from zR and f, respectively.
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Under information asymmetry, high price implies a promising future payoff. However, price
does not increase one for one with payoff, so the demand curve of an uninformed investor must
be downward sloping. Facing an upward-sloping residual supply curve, the informed investor
has to pay a higher price if he demands more shares, or he has to accept a lower price if he sells
more shares. Therefore, the informed will only be willing to accommodate more of liquidity
sells if z is sufficiently higher or more of liquidity buys if z is sufficiently lower. Moreover, the
informed' role of liquidity provision diminishes quickly as z falls, or the former decreases faster
than the latter.
This model features an economy that starts with perfect risk-sharing and ends up with
non-perfect risk-sharing due to an exogenous liquidity shock. Alternatively, for an economy
with imperfect risk-sharing at the outset, information asymmetry will prevents the economy
from achieving the first-best allocation. In the original framework in Grossman (1976), all
investors are competitive price takers. As a result, information asymmetry does not induce
trading frictions, and the equilibrium is independent of initial share allocation. Kyle (1985)
extends the framework to allow for noncompetitive trading behavior. Nevertheless, focusing on
price informativeness and market efficiency, Kyle (1985) does not explore the role of imperfect
information as a new source of trading frictions.
2.4.2 An Information Story of "Disposition Effect"
This model provides an alternative explanation of the "disposition effect." The disposition
effect refers to the tendency of investors to sell stocks that have risen in value since purchase
and to buy stocks that have fallen in value. It is obvious that not all investors will display the
disposition effect in equilibrium. Empirical studies have indeed documented that it is the less
sophisticated investors who are more vulnerable to the apparent behavioral bias. This study
shows that uninformed investors tend to take in excessively more risk in low payoff states, so the
stylized fact may well arise from information asymmetry. However, note that the "disposition
effect" here and that in the behavioral literature differs in a key result. The former implies a
negative return autocorrelation, while the latter a positive autocorrelation.
Proposition 12 The holdings of an uninformed investor xu decreases with z.
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Recall that Proposition 11 holds for any given u. As a result, Proposition 12 follows
immediately from Proposition 11. In this model, price is a monotonically increasing function
of z, and price falls even further as z falls because the holdings of the uninformed tend to
increase as z falls. The uninformed investors are the marginal investors in this economy. Price
hence should reflect the uninformed's expectation of the asset payoff adjusted for compensation
for the risk born by the uninformed. As the uninformed bears disproportionately more risk
in low price state, the expected return conditional on the current price should be a decreasing
function of the price.
Proposition 13
dE [r | P]dE[rIp< 0, where re d - p.
dp
Proof. {rof.p ao2x t (p), if p < pR;E [r | P] =
E [z [z > zR] - zR + a a2xU, ifp= pU.
Moreover,
E[z I zz zR - zR +ao2 2xU
< 2U a 2 ( s
N(2+N) 1 +N 2+N
According to Proposition 12, xu (p) decreases with p, and so does E [r I p-. *
Proposition 13 implies a negative autocorrelation in return. Note that, the larger the initial
deviation from the perfect risk-sharing distribution, the larger this negative autocorrelation. In
addition, the larger the residual uncertainty regarding the payoff measured by a 2 , the stronger
the negative autocorrelation.
This model assumes non-information-motivated trades due to exogenous liquidity shock.
The results discussed previously should also hold, if non-information-motivated trades results
from endogenous deviation from perfect risk-sharing distribution. Suppose the informed in-
vestor starts with xi shares, where x can be any positive number such that x" <xFB s+u.
0 0 y0 N+1"
The analysis for the case in which x > xFB is symmetric and is thus omitted. Note that xFB
refers to the holdings of the informed if the economy achieves the first-best equilibrium with
perfect risk-sharing.
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The degree of under-risk-sharing measured by XFB - x U is positively correlated with the
initial degree of under-risk-sharing measured by xFB - x. Recall that xU denotes the largest
possible holdings of the informed in this economy under information asymmetry, so xFB - xU
captures the degree of desirable risk-sharing that cannot be obtained with imperfect informa-
tion. Note that
S + u +x2+N '
hence,
XFB XU S+u S+u+Xz
N+1 2+N
S + 4 xFB - x
(N 1)(N+2) N+2 N+2
It is obvious that XFB - XU increases with XFB - X.
As is pointed out previously, the uninformed investors are the marginal investors in this
economy. If the informed bears relatively less risk, the uninformed must be bearing excessively
more risk. As a result, the expected return will be relatively high and will increase with the
degree of under-risk-sharing. The expected return not only depends on the current price as is
stated in Proposition 13, but also depends on the stock performance in the recent past. Recent
past poor performance tends to bias x4 downwards and aggravates under-risk-sharing measured
by xFB - U , and vice versa. The downward bias in x4 will increase the expected return over
the subsequent periods and will enhance the negative correlation stated in Proposition 13.
Similarly, for the case in which x > x F , recent past poor performance tends to bias x4
downwards and alleviates under-risk-sharing measured by xFB - XU. Note that xFB - XU < 0
in this case. Therefore, in general, past poor performance tends to increase the expected return
over the subsequent periods, but may enhance or may weaken the negative correlation stated
in Proposition 13.
To sum up, this model of information asymmetry offers an alternative explanation of the
fact that some investors sell at high prices and buy at low prices. Moreover, the magnitude of
this effect depends on historical performance of the specific stock. Past poor stock performance
will strengthen the negative return autocorrelation in a state of predominantly liquidity sells
and relatively low price, but will attenuate the negative return autocorrelation in a state of pre-
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dominantly liquidity buys and relatively high price; and vice versa. These model implications
potentially help us understand some puzzling empirical features of time-series return behavior.
Unlike behavioral models or models of heterogeneous preferences, a model of information asym-
metry can generate negative return autocorrelation that takes effect at the individual stock level
and that is generally state-dependent.
2.4.3 Verifiable vs. Nonverifiable Information
This simple model assumes away the uncertainty regarding non-information-driven trades.
However, price still does not fully reveal private information over certain range of z. Even
when price becomes perfectly informative, the economy does not obtain perfect risk-sharing.
Both equilibrium features seem counter-intuitive and result from the noncompetitive nature
of a market under information asymmetry. The informed acquires private information, and
the private information gets reflected in price via trades by the informed. Price therefore will
not reveal further information if the informed is not willing to trade further. Moreover, the
belief of the uninformed must be sustainable in the equilibrium. Price revelation needs to be
incentive-compatible with the optimality of informed trading. As a result, perfect risk-sharing
is not feasible in this model.
Given the inefficiency in share allocation, the next question is how long this inefficiency will
last. If the value of z is verifiable then the under-risk-sharing should be corrected immediately
after the information revelation via price, assuming that there is no further information asym-
metry regarding future payoff. In contrast, if the value of z is nonverifiable then the imperfect
risk-sharing will not be corrected until the realization of z.
This model thus predicts that the return behavior will differ depending on whether the
private information is verifiable or nonverifiable. The distortion in share distribution must last
longer under situations predominated by nonverifiable information. In those situations, there
can be substantial inertia in share distribution. Inefficiency in allocation slowly adjusts as the
fundamental develops, therefore, we can have seemingly abnormal return predictability at some
fairly low frequency.
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2.4.4 Return Autocorrelation: Positive or Negative
This paper underlines a negative autocorrelation in return due to the downward sloping demand
curve of uninformed investors in a market under information asymmetry. Wu (2007) predicts a
positive return autocorrelation as a result of information asymmetry. Are the two predictions in
conflict? What do we learn about how information imperfections affect stock return behavior?
The two papers present two completely distinctive mechanisms that both lead to some sort
of return autocorrelation. The two mechanisms complement rather than contradict each other.
The seemingly abnormal return predictability in this paper results from predicted variation in
risk premium. This predictability hinges on the systematic component of the residual risk or the
non-private risk. Wu (2007) derives return predictability through the predictability of liquidity
trades in a model of information asymmetry with dysfunctional price. The return predictability
there does not require the risk to be systematic, however, it does require exploitable information
advantage or information-induced distortion in share distribution.
The relevant horizon of return predictability associated with each of those different mech-
anisms also differs. In Wu (2007), the return predictability will weaken as the information-
induced distortion in share allocation dissipates over time. In this paper, if the private infor-
mation is verifiable, return will be predictable only over a very short horizon. If the private
information is nonverifiable, the length of horizon over which return is predictable should match
the frequency of fundamental news announcement.
Return therefore may be negatively autocorrelated in a very short run, but may be positively
autocorrelated in a relatively short run, and may also be negatively autocorrelated in a relatively
long run. The sign of return autocorrelation also depends on the weight of systematic risk
relative to idiosyncratic risk, the noisiness of non-information-driven trades, and etc.
2.5 Conclusion
This study builds upon the important literature on information asymmetry. The current study
contributes to the literature by shifting the focus to the quantity dimension. Examining the
effects of information imperfections on share allocation in addition to price behavior offers
interesting insights on both cross-sectional and time-series return behavior.
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Information potentially plays a crucial role in explaining return predictability or apparent
behavioral biases that are identified in the recent empirical literature. The advantage of an
information-based explanation lies in its ability to explain some puzzling facts at the individual
stock level that are absent in models of commonly accepted behavioral biases or heterogeneous
preferences.
For the next step, it will be important to extend the current simple model to models of
multiple assets and to models of multiple periods. As an overlooked source of trading frictions,
information imperfections can be a key determinant of both individual and aggregate stock
return behavior.
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Chapter 3
Tobin's Tax Revisited: Evidence
from the Chinese Stock Market
This study explores the idea of Tobin's tax in the context of an emerging market and in
particular examines the cost effects on speculation in the Chinese stock market. Inspired by
the theoretical insight of Lo and Wang (2000), I construct a turnover-based empirical proxy for
the aggregate level of speculative activities. Tax and brokerage fee are two major components
of A-share transaction cost in China. I therefore examine how historical changes in tax or in
brokerage fee affect speculative trades. Both time-series analysis of the aggregate measure and
cross-sectional analysis of each policy change suggest that the best way to restrain speculation
is to make the market more competitive. In the event that market is highly noncompetitive,
tax is shown to be effective in curbing speculation.
3.1 Introduction
China's Ministry of Finance announced on January 23, 2005, that stamp duties levied on A-
share1 and B-share2 transactions would be halved to 0.1 per cent starting from the next business
1A-shares are issued by companies incorporated in mainland China and are traded in Shanghai and Shenzhen
stock exchanges. Prices of A-shares are quoted in Renminbi. For the moment, only mainlanders and selected
foreign institutional investors are allowed to trade A-shares.
2 B-shares are issued by companies incorporated in mainland China and are traded in Shanghai and Shenzhen
stock exchanges. Prices of B-shares are quoted in foreign currencies. In the past, only foreigners were allowed to
trade B-shares. Starting from March 2001, mainlanders can also participate in the B-shares market. However,
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day (Monday, January 24, 2005). The decision to reduce the stock trading tax followed the
enactment of State Council guidelines early in the previous year to support the capital market
development, and was thus perceived by market as another policy measure aiming at revitalizing
investors' sentiment and reducing trading costs. Nevertheless, even the nine-point guideline
only provided market indices with a short-lived boost. So was the outlook for the transaction
tax cut.
Immature capital market and immature asset management industry lead to one major fea-
ture that distinguishes the Chinese stock market from any security market in the rest of the
world - participation of a great number of individual investors with limited financial wealth.
Given that a well-functioning supervision and regulation system does not yet exist, the Chi-
nese stock market is plagued with severe information problems. As a result, there is constant
information leakage, frequent informational trades, and, thus, exploitation of naive individual
investors by informed investors or speculators. Unlike investors in developed countries where
they can resort to a wide variety of soundly-managed investment funds, individual investors in
China have to learn their lessons through trial and loss.
Facing the status quo, has the Chinese government made the right decision on its tax policy
regarding transactions in the stock market? This research will study the influences of a tax
change on speculative trading activities, other than its consequences on flows in and out of the
stock market. The flow effects seem to be occupying the full attention of the general public.
I will provide both theoretical motivation and empirical analysis to argue for the importance
of this neglected effect and will also provide policy suggestions for an emerging capital market,
in particular, one characterized by extensive information asymmetry, fledgling institutional
investors and a great number of small individual accounts.
The idea of throwing some sands in the wheels is not unfamiliar. James Tobin first pro-
posed a levy on international currency transactions in 1972, immediately after the collapse of
the Bretton Woods system. The idea was however born way ahead of its time and did not
receive much sympathy then. Nevertheless, the debate on the Tobin's tax, or a securities trans-
action tax, reemerges whenever there is a disruption in financial markets. For example, the
they must trade with legal foreign currency accounts.
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debate rekindled after the Black Monday on October 19, 1987.3 Studies have examined effects
of securities transaction tax on market efficiency for foreign exchange markets and for stock
markets in various countries. The empirical evidence was overall not conclusive. 4 While the
debate previously focuses on the developed markets, this study explores the idea of Tobin's tax
in the context of an emerging market and in particular examines the cost effects on speculation.
Inspired by the theoretical insight of Lo and Wang (2000), I construct a turnover-based
empirical proxy for the aggregate level of speculative activities. Tax and brokerage fee are two
major components of transaction cost in the Chinese stock market. I therefore examine how
historical changes in tax or in brokerage fee affect speculative trades. Both time-series analysis
of the aggregate measure and cross-sectional analysis of each policy change suggest that the
best way to restrain speculation is to make the market more competitive. In the event that
market is highly noncompetitive, tax is shown to be effective in curbing speculation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out some background on
transaction costs in the Chinese stock market. Section 3 provides the theoretical motivation.
Section 4 presents the empirical findings. Section 5 concludes the paper.
3.2 Background
In the Chinese stock market, stamp duties levied on A-share and B-share transactions charge
both buyers and sellers per transaction an amount that is proportional to the transaction value.
The securities transaction tax was first enacted on June 28, 1990, which started as a one-sided
tax of 0.6% imposed on sellers only for all transactions on the Shenzhen exchange. Later in the
same year on November 23, this one-sided tax changed to a two-sided transaction tax applied
to both buyers and sellers. In October 1991, the Shenzhen exchange adjusted the two-sided
tax downward to 0.3%, and meanwhile the Shanghai exchange adopted the same tax policy.
The government raised the tax from 0.3% to 0.5% on May 12, 1997, in order to curb the growth
of an overheated speculative stock market. The tax rate came back down to 0.4% on June 12,
3 Summers and Summers (1989), and Stiglitz (1989) writes to advocate a transaction cost. Stiglitz (1989) in
particular builds his argument upon the assumption that trading is a zero-sum game. Ross (1989) refutes his
assumption and calls for evidence.
aSee, for example, Umlauf (1993), Campbell and Froot (1994), Frankel (1996), Jones and Seguin (1997), Tyler
(1999), and Habermeier and Kirilenko (2001).
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1998. Later, to stimulate trading activities in the B-share market, the government reduced
the tax rate on B-share transactions to 0.3%. Used as one of the measures to revitalize the
market, the proportional stock transaction tax was halved to 0.2% on November 16, 2001, and
was further halved to 0.1% on January 24, 2005.
Table 3.1 summarizes the historical change in the stamp duty levied on A-share transactions
since its inception in 1990. Even though the Chinese stock market has experienced rapid growth
in the recent past, the annual revenue due to the stock transaction tax stays below 1% of the
total government tax revenue.
Table 3.1. History of A-Share Transaction Tax Changes
Date Tax Rate Buyers/Sellers Exchange*
28-Jun-1990 0.6% sellers only Shenzhen only
23-Nov-1990 0.6% both Shenzhen only
Oct-1991 0.3% both both
12-May-1997 0.5% both both
12-Jun-1998 0.4% both both
16-Nov-2001 0.2% both both
24-Jan-2005 0.1% both both
*Note that there are two regional stock exchanges in China: the Shanghai exchange
and the Shenzheng exchange.
The stamp duty is only part of the transaction costs encountered by an investor in the
Chinese stock market. In addition to the stamp duty, a typical investor also faces the following
costs per transaction including a brokerage fee, a supervision fee, and a servicing fee. Table 3.2
lists the most up-to-date relevant trading costs for a single transaction of share A, either sell
or purchase, in the Chinese stock market. The stamp duty accounts for a significant portion
of the trading costs and therefore can be an effective policy instrument in fine tuning trading
activities.
Brokerage fee is another significant component of A-share transaction costs, so ignoring
brokerage fee can bias our analysis of tax effects. In the past, all brokerage firms have to abide
by one standard rate regulated by the government. Starting from April 4, 2002, brokerage fee
is allowed to float within bounds, lower than 0.3% but higher than the sum of supervision and
servicing fees. Table 3.3 displays the history of brokerage fee changes. The empirical analysis
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Table 3.2. Decomposition of A-Share Transaction Costs
Cost Component Recipient Rate of Charge
brokerage fee brokerage house 0.2%
stamp duty government 0.1%
supervision fee SEC 0.004%
servicing fee exchange 0.015%
in this paper takes into account the historical variation in both transaction taxes and brokerage
fee.
Table 3.3. History of Brokerage Fee Changes
Date Rate
7-Jun-1990 5%
1-Jan-1993 0.7%
11-May-1993 0.4%
3-Oct-1996 0.35%
1-Aug-2001 0.2%
As fierce competition among brokerage firms drives down the transaction cost, government
intervention can be necessary at the current stage of market development. First of all, a larger
trading cost can better protect naYve investors and help lengthen their investment horizon.
Second, the asset management industry has just come into existence recently in China and is
still in its incubation period. A rapid growth by profiteering from informational trades can
result in an unhealthy industry in the long run. Finally, as existing studies have shown, longer
investment horizon held by investors serves as better corporate governance curbing managerial
myopia. In an emerging market such as the Chinese stock market, excessive growth of specu-
lative trading activities can exacerbate the already weak corporate governance. Therefore, the
government should consider maintaining a nontrivial tax rate for the moment. It is important
to establish an ethical asset management industry and to establish an effective information
monitoring system before completely liberating the market. A simple convergence to the tax
design in developed world may generate welfare losses in emerging markets.
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3.3 Theoretical Motivation
Trading activities in financial markets consist of speculative trades and non-speculative trades.
The latter includes liquidity trades and noise trades. Liquidity trades refer to rationally opti-
mized non-information-driven trades, while noise trades refer to trades by "mistake." Studies of
differential information suggest that the noise ratio, i.e., the ratio of noise trades over liquidity
trades, is a key determinant of the profitability of speculative trades. The higher the noise
ratio, the lower the profitability of speculative trades. The volume of speculative trades thus
increases with the noise ratio. This paper examines how changes in different components of
stock transaction costs, namely the stamp duty and brokerage fee, affect the noise ratio and in
turn speculative trading activities.
Lowering the transaction cost makes it more appealing to invest in the stock market, only
if an investor is expected to alter his or her portfolio frequently over time. In the case of the
latest tax cut, the stamp duty was reduced by 0.1%. Consider an investor who rebalances
his portfolio once every year. The marginal effect on his annual portfolio return due to the
tax change is about 0.2%, which is negligible compared to an average annual market return of
8% (from 1999 to 2002). Nonetheless, Feng and Seasholes (2003) have shown that portfolio
turnover is surprisingly high in the Chinese stock market . They report that the average
individual holds RMB 135,127 on June 1, 2000. Over the next month (June 2000) the average
individual purchases RMB 64,413 of stock and sells RMB 77,351. The turnover rate is close
to 50% per month. The average annual turnover rate for an average individual investor is as
high as 600%.
Consider a more general case where the investor rebalances his entire portfolio N times
a year, assuming the annualized gross return rate on his portfolio without trading taxes is
R, the rate of return will become R 1-' R (1 - r)2N where r denotes the proportional(1+-r)
transaction cost. The current transaction levy in China is imposed on both buyers and sellers
of shares. The tax impact on the annual rate of return is approximately -2NT. When N
equals 6, a decrease in stamp duty of 0.1% can generate an increase in investment return of
1.2%. Therefore, unless investors expect to trade frequently, the tax incidence will be trivial.
An increase in tax rate will deter both liquidity trades and noise trades, but will affect
noise trades more than liquidity trades because noise trades take place at a higher frequency
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than liquidity trades. Accordingly, the change in tax rate should matter more to the profits
of noise trading. A noise trader should hence be more sensitive to the adjustment in tax rate.
As a consequence of a tax increase, the overall volume of trades will decrease. Furthermore,
the noise ratio will decrease with the tax rate, and so will the volume of speculative trading
activities, which leads to the first test hypothesis for my empirical analysis.
Hypothesis 1 The volume of speculative trades decreases with the rate of proportional trans-
action tax.
Both brokerage fee and the stamp duty are major components of transaction costs. There
is however important difference between the two. Brokerage fee is collected by brokerage firms
who actively participate in trading and represent a group of relatively large and sophisticated
investors in the market, while the stamp duty is collected by a third party who does not
participate in the market. Therefore, the latter should discourage trades in general. In
contrast, the former will not necessarily reduce aggregate trading volume, but will alter the
allocation of trading profits and in turn the noise ratio.
On one hand, high brokerage fee may increase transaction costs and thus deter frequent
trading. On the other hand, high fee will incentivize stock brokers to induce their clients to
make excessive transactions, for example, through persistent persuasion or through transaction
rebates. Brokerage firms who simultaneously play multiple roles as a broker, a speculator,
and a market maker, must have a stronger incentive to encourage noise trades as opposed to
liquidity trades. Therefore, this positive fee effect on trading will increase the ratio of noise
trades over liquidity trades. On the contrary, a reduction in brokerage fee will decrease the
noise ratio.
Finally, note that neither tax changes nor brokerage fee changes in China are exogenous.
In particular, brokerage fee plays the role of a barometer indicating the competitiveness among
large investors or the de factor speculators in the Chinese stock market. A decrease in brokerage
fee should thus correspond to an improvement of competitiveness among speculators, which will
diminish the profitability of speculation and further discourage speculation. All in all, as a
consequence of a downward adjustment in brokerage fee, the ratio of noise trades relative to
liquidity trades should decrease, and so should the level of speculation; and vice versa. Here
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follows the second test hypothesis for my empirical analysis.
Hypothesis 2 The volume of speculative trades increases with brokerage fee.
This paper aims to understand and measure the policy effect on speculative trading. I
therefore conduct empirical testing centered on Hypotheses 1 and 2. The empirical proxy for
the volume of speculative trades derives from a theoretical insight of Lo and Wang (2000). Lo
and Wang (2000) point out that when two-fund separation holds the turnover of all individual
stocks must be identical. If the CAPM holds, all investors will allocate their financial wealth
in two funds, the riskfree bond and the market portfolio. Different investors may assign
different weights to these two funds. The weights may also vary over time. Regardless the
variation in the ratio of the risky portion versus the riskless portion, the composition of the risky
portfolio held by any investor stays constant and is exactly the same as the market portfolio.
Therefore, the dollar trading volume of any individual stock must be proportional to its market
capitalization. In other words, the turnover of all individual stocks must be identical.
In this paper, I measure the volume of speculative trades using the difference between
the equally-weighted turnover and the value-weighted turnover. Given that the Chinese stock
market represents only a small fraction of the domestic economy and that average small investors
in China have limited access to financial market or limited investment opportunities, the CAPM
should be a good approximation of the Chinese stock market in the absence of speculative trades.
According to Lo and Wang (2000), average turnover with any sort of weighting scheme should
be identical, so the difference should be zero without speculation. However, firms with small
market capitalization tend to be more vulnerable to speculation. The discrepancy arises as
the existence of speculative trades makes the turnover of small stocks relatively high. The
difference between the equally-weighted turnover and the value-weighted turnover thus implies
the existence of speculative activities and increases with the volume of speculative trades.
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3.4 Empirical Findings
3.4.1 Data
The empirical analyses in this paper employ data on daily share volume, daily price, and
tradable market capitalization for all A-share stocks.
There are two regional stock exchanges in China, the Shanghai exchange and the Shenzhen
exchange. The earliest available record is dated December 19, 1990 for the former and July 3,
1991 for the latter. A public company lists in exactly one of the two exchanges. Both exchanges
share nearly the same transaction costs during the entire sample period. The investor base is
also similar for these two exchanges. Since there is little systematic difference between the two
exchanges, the analysis will not distinguish stocks by exchange.
I exclude the first 250 daily observations for each individual stock, because the IPOs in
China are subject to severe underpricing. Monthly turnover rate and market capitalization are
measured as average daily turnover and market capitalization over the particular month. The
sample period starts in December 1991 and ends in December 2004. The entire time series of
aggregate stock data thus have 157 monthly observations.
The Chinese stock market has experienced enormous growth over the past decade. Figure
3.2 displays the rapid growth of the number of stocks covered in the sample data. There
are roughly 10 stocks traded in 1991, but the number increases to more than 1200 in 2004.
Investor behavior has also evolved over time. Turnover rate is significantly higher during the
first half of the sample period than in the more recent years. Figure 3.3 plots the change
in the average turnover weighted by market capitalization, over the whole sample period from
December 1991 to December 2004. Figure 3.4 exhibits the change in the difference between the
equally-weighted turnover and the value-weighted turnover. It is consistent with the theory
prediction that this difference is mostly positive. The discrepancy is much higher during the
earlier years and has declined over time, which suggests that speculative trades carry a heavier
weight at the earlier stage of the market development but play a diminishing role at the later
stage.
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Figure 3-2: Value-Weighted Average Turnover, 1991-2004
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3.4.2 Time-Series Analysis
In this section, I investigate whether the variation in the aggregate measure of speculative
trading, i.e. the equally-weighted average turnover minus the value-weighted average turnover,
can be explained by tax change or brokerage fee change. In particular, I test the following
linear model:
Vt = co + c lVt-1 + c2t + c3t + Et. (3.1)
Vt and Vt_1 represent respectively the current and the lagged measures of aggregate speculative
trades. rt represents the tax rate levied on A-share transactions. 6t represents the brokerage
fee at time t. Et represents the noise term and can be heteroskedastic. co, c1 , c2, and C3
denote the corresponding coefficients. The level of active speculation is highly persistent 5 , so
the model includes a lagged term of the aggregate measure.
Note that the brokerage fee was 5% at the inception of the Chinese stock market, and the
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5 See the first column in Table 5.
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rate was exponentially higher than that in the subsequent years. The linear model described
by Equation (3.1) must be inadequate due to this substantial variation in brokerage fee at
the outset. To fix the problem, I can amend the simple linear model by introducing a dummy
variable for the period of December 1991 to December 1992 over which the huge fee was effective.
Equivalently, I conduct tests excluding that period. So the empirical analyses in this section
are based on 144 monthly observations from January 1993 to December 2004.
As is shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.3, and Figure 3.3, the aggregate measure of speculation,
the tax rate, and the brokerage fee all exhibit a declining trend over time. To avoid spurious
correlation due to cointegration, I detrend all three time series, so Vt, -rt, and 6t denote the
detrended component after eliminating a linear trend or a constant yearly drift. Table 3.4
provides results from the detrending regressions. On average, brokerage fee falls by 0.024%
per year. The tax rate falls by 0.009% every year. The level of speculation has also been
decreasing by 0.044% per year in terms of daily turnover. All three time trends are significant
at less than 1% level.
Table 3.4. Detrending Time Series
Brokerage Fee Tax Rate EW-VW Turnover
year -0.024 -0.009 -0.044
(18.29)*** (4.09)*** (4.84)***
Constant 0.331 0.32 0.186
(71.70)*** (43.26)*** (5.98)***
Observations 144 144 144
R-squared 0.7 0.11 0.14
Absolute value of robust t statistics are reported in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Table 3.5 shows the regression results based on Equation (3.1). As is predicted, the level of
speculative trades decreases by 1.66% for each one percentage decrease in brokerage fee. The
heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistic is about 2.4 for the coefficient estimate. The tax effect
on speculation is not statistically significant, but the coefficient estimate is negative as predicted
and suggests an increase of 0.34% for each one percentage of tax cut. Table 3.5 confirms that
it is important to include brokerage fee in the analysis. Without accounting for brokerage fee
changes, the model would have underestimated the tax effect. 6
Table 3.5. Cost Effects on Speculative Trades (Vt)
Vt Vt Vt Vt
Vt-1 0.794 0.725 0.637 0.624
(5.49)*** (7.07)*** (7.07)*** (6.65)***
Vt-2 -0.093
-0.9
Tt -0.024 -0.343
-0.1 -1.13
6t 1.46 1.663
(2.42)** (2.41)**
Observations 144 144 144 144
R-squared 0.54 0.53 0.57 0.58
Absolute value of robust t statistics are reported in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
The time series of the tax rate and brokerage fee must be highly autocorrelated, because
those two variables change at fairly low frequency by nature. Recall that the level of speculation
Vt is also highly autocorrelated. Concerns may arise that strong autocorrelation can lead to
biases in estimates. To alleviate the concerns, I extract the residual from regressing Vt on its
own lag Vt-1 and denote the residual by Ut. This unpredicted component Ut has nearly zero
autocorrelation. 7 The results in Table 3.6 confirm those in Table 3.5. The estimated effects
are slightly weaker. A reduction of 1% in brokerage fee coincides with a fall in speculation
of 1.35% in terms of daily turnover. The estimated effect is significant at 5% level assuming
heteroskedasticity. The tax effect is estimated to be negative but not statistically significant,
and the effect would have been substantially underestimated without proper consideration of
brokerage fee change.
As both tax and brokerage fee adjust infrequently, I further examine the robustness of the
estimated cost effects by replacing rt and bt with dummy variables. The regression is based on
the following linear model:
Vt = ao + aVt- 1 + a2 ST5t + a3ST4t + a4ST2t + asBF4t + a6BF35t + a7BF2t + e~t. (3.2)
6Compare the second and the fourth columns of Table 5.
7See the first column in Table 6.
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Table 3.6. Cost Effects on Speculative Trades (Ut)
Ut Ut Ut Ut
Ut-1 0.068
-0.47
Tt -0.024 -0.278
-0.1 -0.95
6t 1.217 1.351(2.00)** (2.00)**
Observations 144 144 144 144
R-squared 0 0 0.07 0.08
Absolute value of robust t statistics are reported in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Vt is defined as previously to be the detrended level of speculation. ST5t, ST4t, and ST2t
refer to the dummy variables for the period with the tax rate in effect being 0.5%, 0.4%, and
0.2%, respectively.8 Similarly, BF4t, a6 BF35t, and a7BF2t refer to the dummy variables for
the period with the brokerage fee in effect being 0.4%, 0.35%, and 0.2%, respectively.9 Et
represents the noise term and can be heteroskedastic. a0 through a7 denote the corresponding
constant coefficients.
Table 3.7 shows the estimated cost effects derived from regression results based on Equation
(3.2). I compare the coefficients corresponding to adjacent periods to illustrate the effects of
tax change or brokerage fee change. These estimated policy effects are also least susceptible
to biases due to missing variables. For example, turnover in January 1998 when the tax rate
is 0.5% may differ widely from that in January 2003 when the tax rate is 0.2%. Over a
period of 5 years, many other things could have happened that would affect turnover. The last
tax cut in November 2001, from 0.4% to 0.2%, increases speculative trades by 0.07% in daily
turnover, and the estimate is significant at less than the 0.1% level. Although the estimates
are statistically insignificant for the first two tax changes, in May 1997 and in June 1998, the
sign of the estimates is consistent with the theory prediction. The estimated effects of all three
brokerage fee changes are highly significant. The first fee cut in May 1993 coincides with a
drop of 0.94% in daily turnover. The last fee cut in August 2001 also coincides with a drop of
8The dummy variable for the period with the tax rate in effect being 0.3% is dropped from the regression.
9The dummy variable for the period with the brokerage fee in effect being 0.7% is dropped from the regression.
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0.2% in daily turnover. However, the second fee cut in October 1996 coincides with an increase
of 0.24% in daily turnover, which contradicts the theory prediction. Tables 3.5-3.7 provide
overall consistent findings.
Table 3.7. Policy Effects on Speculative Trades
Event Change in Speculative Trades p-value
(daily turnover, %)
Tax Rate:
0.3% to 0.5% (a 2) -0.123 0.321
0.5% to 0.4% (a 3 - a2) 0.023 0.805
0.4% to 0.2% (a4 - a3 ) 0.066 0.000
Brokerage Fee:
0.7% to 0.4% (as) -0.941 0.000
0.4% to 0.35% (a 6 - a 5) 0.241 0.018
0.35% to 0.2% (a7 - a 6) -0.060 0.003
Investigating the aggregate measure of the level of speculative trades verifies the theoretical
prediction in Section 3. Brokerage fee cuts are strongly correlated with decreases in the level
of speculation. Tax effects are relatively weaker and statistically insignificant, nevertheless,
the estimates exhibit the same sign as is predicted. We should however take these empirical
findings with caveats. Since both tax change and brokerage fee change occur infrequently,
the estimates based on the time-series analysis of the aggregate measure essentially reflect
the relatively long-run effects. The corresponding horizon depends on the interval between
adjacent policy changes. These estimates therefore may well be subject to biases due to
missing variables, and possibly to different degrees. In addition, imperfect detrending may
introduce further noises. The next section will conduct cross-sectional analysis immediately
around the policy changes in order to reassure the robustness of the results.
3.4.3 Cross-Sectional Analysis
Since the establishment of the Shanghai exchange in 1990 and the Shenzhen exchange in 1991,
the Chinese stock market has gone through considerable development in a short history of 15
years. For example, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, also known as CSRC, was
enacted in October 1992. In December 1996, the government installed the 10% limit of daily
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variation in closing price. Securities investment funds took off in late 1997. On November
5, 2002, the CSRC and the People's Bank of China introduced the QFII (Qualified Foreign
Institutional Investor) program as a provision for foreign capital to access China's financial
markets. These major regulatory changes certainly impact the operations of the stock market.
It is however difficult to perfectly control for changes in macro conditions, especially given a
short sample period. In response to the concerns, this section will examine policy effects in a
relatively short run by running cross-sectional regressions.
Recall that Lo and Wang (2000) point out that when two-fund separation holds the turnover
of all individual stocks should be identical. Without speculative trades, the change in turnover
responding to a tax change or a fee adjustment should also be identical across all individual
stocks. In contrast, with the existence of speculative trades, the change in turnover will vary
across stocks and should be a function of the past turnover. Investors will minimize the cost
effect by adjusting their trading frequency. The higher the past turnover, the larger the cost
effect, and therefore the larger the change in turnover. If a policy change reduces the level of
speculation, the decrease in turnover due to declining speculation should be largest for stocks
with highest past turnover. It follows that the difference in turnover should diminish, and
the change in turnover should be negatively correlated with the past turnover. Similarly, if a
policy change turns out encouraging speculation, changes will occur in the opposite direction.
I construct my cross-sectional regressions in the following way. For each tax change or
brokerage fee adjustment that occurs in month t, I measure the difference in average daily
turnover between the period of 3 months before the change (month t - 4 to month t - 2) and
the period of 3 months after the change (month t + 2 to month t + 4), for each single stock. I
skip the month immediately preceding and the month immediately ensuing the change to avoid
transitional effects. The average daily turnover over the period from month t- 7 to month t -5
is used as the proxy for past turnover. I regress the change in turnover on past turnover. If the
change results from the change in non-speculative trades, then the coefficient estimate should
differ insignificantly from zero. If the change results from a fall in speculative trades, then the
loadings on past turnover should be significantly negative. Finally, if the change results from
a rise in speculative trades, then the loadings on past turnover should be significantly positive.
Table 3.8 provides the cross-sectional regression results for the three tax changes: an increase
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Table 3.8. Effects of Tax Change on Speculative Trades
(Cross-Sectional Regressions)
12-May-97 12-Jun-98 16-Nov-01
0.3% to 0.5% 0.5% to 0.4% 0.4% to 0.2%
Past Turnover -0.223 -0.368 0.046
(8.52)*** (6.97)*** (1.44)
Observations 310 516 955
R-squared 0.19 0.09 0.00
Absolute value of t statistics are reported in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
of 0.2% in May 1997, a reduction of 0.1% in June 1998, and a reduction of 0.2% in November
2001. The results stay consistent with the findings in Section 4.2. The tax effects on speculation
remain mixed. The increase of tax rate in 1997 is shown to have effectively curbed speculation.
The cross-sectional variation in average daily turnover decreases by 22.3% ensuing the tax
change. The tax cut in 1998 is nevertheless followed by a decrease of 36.8% in the cross-
sectional difference in turnover, which contradicts the prediction. A possible explanation is
that the government intends to revitalize the market through a tax cut, but in fact the initial
slow down in transactions results from cooling speculation. Table 3.8 also suggests that the last
tax cut in 2001 increases speculation marginally, and the estimate is not statistically significant.
Table 3.9. Effects of Brokerage Fee Change on Speculative Trades
(Cross-Sectional Regressions)
11-May-93 3-Oct-96 1-Aug-01
0.7% to 0.4% 0.4% to 0.35% 0.35% to 0.2%
Past Turnover -1.503 -0.689 -0.542
(4.71)*** (6.19)*** (12.43)***
Observations 13 295 931
R-squared 0.67 0.12 0.14
Absolute value of t statistics are reported in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Table 3.9 provides the cross-sectional regression results for the three brokerage fee adjust-
ments: a cut of 0.3% in May 1993, a cut of 0.05% in October 1996, and a cut of 0.15% in August
2001. The results firmly support the findings in Section 4.2. All three downward adjustments
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in brokerage fee are shown to have effectively curbed speculation. The effects on speculative
trades are highly significant both economically and statistically.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper has found weak evidence of tax effects on speculative trades in the Chinese stock
market. The tax rate changes usually reflect policy responses to changing market conditions.
The government can adjust the tax rate downward to stimulate a stagnating market or adjust
the tax rate upward to restrain an overheated market. If the initial slowdown or speedup in
trading activities is attributable to changes in speculative trades, the endogeneity of tax change
will offset the tax effects on speculation and thus weaken our empirical results. Therefore, we
can interpret the ambiguous findings in two ways. One possibility is that tax changes leave no
effects on speculative trades in the Chinese stock market. Alternatively, it is possible that tax
reductions do make small investors more vulnerable to exploitation by large investors, but the
endogeneity of tax changes makes it difficult to empirically detect this tax effect.
The reduction in brokerage fee however plays an unambiguous role in explaining decreasing
level of speculation. Like the tax change, the change in brokerage fee can also be endogenous.
Brokerage fee cuts are often signs of increasing competitiveness among brokerage houses. The
improvement in competition is proved to be an undoubtedly good protection for unsophisticated
investors. On the other hand, the drop in brokerage fee should diminish the competitive edge of
brokerage firms relative to other traders in the market and should enhance the competitiveness
of market making, which further improves the market competition and reduces speculation.
The endogeneity in this case strengthens the estimate of cost effects.
To conclude, the empirical findings in this paper suggest that the best way to restrain
speculation is to make the market more competitive. In the event that market is highly
noncompetitive, tax is shown to be effective in curbing speculation. It will be interesting to
conduct a comparative study on how stock markets in different countries, such as Japan or
Taiwan, evolve from high-securities-transaction-tax regime to low-tax regime.
128
3.6 Bibliography
[1] U. Bhattacharya and N. Galpin. is stock picking declining around the world? Nov. 2005.
[2] J. Y. Campbell and K. A. Froot. International experiences with securities transaction
taxes. In J. A. Frankel, editor, The Internationalization of Equity Markets, pages 277-303.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.
[3] L. Feng and M. S. Seasholes. A profile of individual investors in an emerging stock
market. Feb. 2003.
[4] J. A. Frankel. How well do foreign exchange markets function: might a Tobin tax help?
NBER Working Paper 5422, Jan. 1996.
[5] K. Habermeier and A. Kirilenko. Securities transaction taxes and financial markets.
IMF Working Paper, May 2001.
[6] C. M. Jones and P. J. Seguin. Transaction costs and price volatility: Evidence from
commission deregulation. American Economic Review, 87(4):728-737, Sept. 1997.
[7] A. W. Lo and J. Wang. Trading volume: Definitions, data analysis, and implications of
portfolio theory. Review of Financial Studies, 13(2):257-300, 2000.
[8] R. Pollin. Applying a securities transactions tax to the us: Design issues, market impact,
revenue estimates. In G. Epstein, editor, Financialization and the World Economy. Edward
Elgar, 2005.
[9] R. Pollin, D. Baker, and M. Schaberg. Securities transaction taxes for US financial
markets. Oct. 2002.
[10] S. A. Ross. Commentary: Using tax policy to curb speculative short-term trading.
Journal of Financial Services Research, 3:117-120, 1989.
[11] J. E. Stiglitz. Using tax policy to curb speculative short-term trading. Journal of
Financial Services Research, 3:101-115, 1989.
[12] L. H. Summers and V. P. Summers. When financial markets work too well: A cautious
case for a securities transactions tax. Journal of Financial Services Research, 3:261-286, 1989.
[13] P. Tyler. Stamp duty on share transactions - an international perspective. A report
for the association of private client investment managers and stockbrokers, Oct. 1999.
[14] M. ul Haq, I. Kaul, and I. Grunberg. The Tobin Tax: coping with financial Volatility.
Oxford University Press, 1996.
129
[15] S. R. Umlauf. Transaction taxes and the behavior of the Swedish stock market. Journal
of Financial Economics, 33:227-240, 1993.
[16] D. Waldenstrom. Why are securities transactions taxed? evidence from Sweden, 1909-
1991. Financial History Review, 9, Oct. 2002.
130
